Blog

Introduction&nbsp;Urban trees play a significant role in mitigating climate change and enhancing the overall environmental condition of any city. However, in some metropolitan areas, these important green spaces are not properly protected, leading to deforestation and the loss of their benefits.&nbsp;Duhok governorate is in the Kurdistan region, a mountainous destination between magnificent Valleys. It has an abundance of fertile plains, trees all around the city, and forests (Duhok province) like Zawita, which contains a ridge 70% covered by pine forest, but oak woodlands also exist here (Nature Iraq). These features have significant environmental benefits. Fig. (1) shows plenty of Duhok governorate’s woodland land.Despite having these important naturally grown trees and woodland areas in the Duhok governorate, there is uncertainty about whether they are adequately protected and managed. These resources might be at risk of deforestation or insufficient conservation efforts, potentially contributing to the increasing effects of climate change. This research seeks to evaluate whether the urban trees of the Duhok governorate are being protected and managed. &nbsp;It aims to provide some proper evidence on the current state of urban tree protection and management. By following the research question; How is the current situation of urban trees in Duhok governorate? Understanding the true status of trees and forestry areas' protection and management is essential to be explored because ignorance of environmental health is the most dispersal issue in the Duhok governorate. Bringing quantitative analysis for the purpose of greeneries, information from key informant people in charge, and documents into existence as pieces of evidence will help determine whether the forestry areas are adequately protected and managed, or if there are weaknesses in enforcement and management that threaten their preservation.&nbsp;This study argued that although urban trees in duhok governorate are recognized for their ecological and social importance. Their current protection and management fall below international standards. This makes them easy to damage as cities keep growing. Therefore, stronger polices, better planning, and support from the community are needed to keep these green items safe and sustainable.&nbsp;Theoretical background and methodological overview&nbsp;Urban trees help clean the air, reduce heat, and improve mental health, making them more important for sustainable cities (Roy et al., 2012, p.352). Their presence also reflects the strength of planning policies and environmental awareness in the city (Konijnendijk et al., 2005, pp.5–7). &nbsp;However, in Duhok governorate, the importance of urban trees has been largely overlooked. There is little research on how many trees exist, where they are located, and how well they are maintained. Revealing a clear gap that this study aims to address. To put Duhok into perspective, this research examines two international cases. Ethiopia’s Green Legacy Campaign successfully mobilized millions of citizens and international partners to plant 20 billion trees, showing how political will, education, and funding can drive large-scale change (SAVI,2023). South Australia, on the other hand, used data-driven policies such as LIDAR mapping, climate resilient species selection, and tree replacement laws to manage its urban canopy (Government of South Australia Report,2024, p.13)&nbsp;This study combined expert interviews and document review with quantitative analysis using the German SI standard. Duhok city was selected as a case study to explore issues in depth. &nbsp; <figure id="figure-hok8qt87armdr9iemm"><img id="hok8qt87armdr9iemm" src="https://cdn.durable.co/blocks/bqgYpTTPEVWSayvJEQyBpsWS3Wt5k5b4sIWmaMwBvaNJKrVxYOI8tIiRkVVNNOs7.png" alt="" title="" class="object-cover bg-gray-100" style="aspect-ratio: 16/9; object-position: center center;" data-corners="default" data-aspect="16:9" data-caption="" data-positionx="undefined" data-positiony="undefined" data-fullwidth="false" data-mce-src="https://cdn.durable.co/blocks/bqgYpTTPEVWSayvJEQyBpsWS3Wt5k5b4sIWmaMwBvaNJKrVxYOI8tIiRkVVNNOs7.png" data-mce-style="aspect-ratio: 16/9; object-position: center center;"></figure> The status of urban trees in Duhok governorateThe current situation of Duhok shows there has been some progress, but also many serious problems. From the interviews, all three participants agreed that the situation has improved in some ways, but it’s still far from good.&nbsp;Muhamed, H. N. (2025), a forestry expert and a professor at the University of Duhok, began by acknowledging the city’s efforts- over the past few years, more than 10 major green initiatives have been launched. These include tree planting campaigns, new parks, and public awareness programs in schools and universities. But despite these efforts, he pointed out, many of the projects don’t last. “Only about 40 to 50 percent of the green projects survive long term,” he explained.” The rest fade away mostly because of the poor follow up- there’s little to no care after planting.”Dr. Muhamed, H. N., Also Emphasized a recurring issue: not enough people are brought to the planning process.” In most cases, only government departments are involved, but local communities, universities, and NGOs are left out.” He said. This professor also estimated that only 20 percent of projects have proper stakeholder involvement. He spoke passionately about the need to build capacity among current staff. Only a handful are trained in forestry or landscaping.”Another big concern mentioned by Dr. Hassan was the way land is being used in Duhok city. He described how construction projects are expanding into the surrounding mountains and along the Hishkarow River, which are not as planned in the Duhok city master plan.” In the past ten years, we have lost at least 15 to 20 percent of green spaces due to informal housing and houses we call them (MAZRA’A). He believed that part of the problem is that environmental studies are not taken seriously.” Only about 30% of new development projects complete a proper environmental impact assessment. The rest go ahead without considering the long-term damage.Another perspective came from Albeyboni (2024), “while Duhok has progressed in recent years, such as the formation of a dedicated department for parks and greenery, major challenges persist. She noted that public awareness is slowly improving and that initiatives like the one million tree campaign and the expansion of parks like Aloka and Serhildan have been steps in the right direction, potentially increasing the city’s green cover by 3-4%. However, she emphasized that green spaces per capita remain critically low, with the green space per capita being around 2 square meters, far from the WHO international standard, which is 9 square meters per capita, and many communities lack proper access to greenery. On the issue of protection, Albeyboni (2025) said that while laws like Law No.8 of 2008, the Duhok master plan (2008-2032), and penalties exist to discourage illegal cutting, they are rarely enforced.A journalist who closely works and follows environmental issues in Duhok confirmed that the condition of urban trees is getting worse due to several major causes. “The protection is weak and monitoring is nearly absent.” He said that the biggest reason for tree loss is ongoing conflicts near the borders. In one area called Baregare, about 40,000 trees that are over 30 years old were destroyed between 2023-2024 due to fighting between Turkish forces and the PKK.&nbsp;Another serious issue is illegal logging by merchants who cut trees over 100-200 years old to sell as coal. Urban expansion adds to the problem- he gave an example of a resident who cut down 200 trees just to build a house. He also mentioned that some government projects, especially from the Duhok Road and Bridge Directorate, often clear large areas of trees without planting new ones.Both journalist and academic staff pointed out that while the population is increasing, the number of trees is decreasing, and nothing is being planted to replace the loss.Although there are laws that say each new house should have at least two trees, the journalist said that people don’t follow this. You can see many houses without even one tree. He suggested creating a special court for environmental issues and imposing dedicated fines on any person for a tree they cut.&nbsp;Another big problem is protection, he said. There are no clear borders around forested areas, no fire protection systems, and no proper forest guards. Fires destroy trees every year, and no one is there to stop them. He also shared a shocking story: in 2022, one person cut down 3,600 trees on a mountain, and no one was arrested or questioned. According to him, people who destroy trees often have power and connections, while those trying to protect nature are few and unsupported.The documents reviewed also confirmed that urban trees are not protected. A study by Ibrahim et al. (2017) showed that between 1984 and 2015, vegetation in Duhok dropped from 30.7% to 20.1% while built-up area increased from 8.3% to 25.3%. Another study from 2021 using satellite images showed that green areas in lowland and urban areas are shrinking more and more between 2000 and 2019. This is partly from less rain, but mostly because of construction.&nbsp; “Standard-based evaluation “of Duhok city urban trees&nbsp;When the Duhok city Master plan was created by a foreign company, they assumed the government to then use the German SI standard for urban tree management and climate resilience of Duhok city. So this study, in turn, analyzed whether the SI standard is followed or not, incorporating quantitative analysis by using the German Standard (SI) guideline.&nbsp;<figure id="figure-4ermg0icg4mdr9jq2z"><img id="4ermg0icg4mdr9jq2z" src="https://cdn.durable.co/blocks/e2QSsb1T5htnWVFhxNvuZ0td3AkurMd5cxeQf57qGezpwjwUajnZokW1IVuvDtdA.png" alt="" title="" class="object-cover bg-gray-100" style="aspect-ratio: 16/9; object-position: center center;" data-corners="default" data-aspect="16:9" data-caption="" data-positionx="undefined" data-positiony="undefined" data-fullwidth="false" data-mce-src="https://cdn.durable.co/blocks/e2QSsb1T5htnWVFhxNvuZ0td3AkurMd5cxeQf57qGezpwjwUajnZokW1IVuvDtdA.png" data-mce-style="aspect-ratio: 16/9; object-position: center center;"></figure> Due to the unavailability of the third factor of the SI standard, this study estimated the number of trees based on two factors: vehicles and electricity generators. After the above calculations required number of trees should be 3,287,316 trees. &nbsp;Currently, Duhok city has around 32,000 trees (S. Salah,2024, personal communication). But when we look at just two factors –vehicles and electricity generators, the number of trees the city needs jump to about 3,287,316 (above calculations). That’s more than 100 times the current number. The surprising part is that’s not even the full picture; this estimate doesn’t include the third factor, the number of high-rise buildings, due to the unavailability of data. This means the actual number of trees needed may be even higher.In short, while there have been some positive steps, Duhok still faces serious problems like weak law enforcement and poor urban planning. From their perspectives, along with revised documents and quantitative analysis, it’s clear that Duhok has made efforts to improve urban greenery, but significant gaps remain both in the quality and quantity of urban trees. Limited green spaces per person, weak enforcement of protection laws, and a limited number of trees based on the SI standard reveal ongoing challenges.Recommendations were proposed based on the weaknesses identified from the findings. To balance the urban trees with urban areas in Duhok governorate and to address the existing challenges through practical and informed solutions. &nbsp;Despite having well-defined laws and regulations for greenery in Duhok governorate, their enforcement and implementation remain weak. Partly due to differences in public mentality and point of view on greeneries compared to some other parts of the world, and because the situation in the Kurdistan region is shaped more by urgent concerns such as economic difficulties, political instability, and the effects of conflicts. These challenges make it hard to focus on environmental goals.&nbsp;Suggested planning standards for urban trees.&nbsp;This study recommends some solutions as initial steps, first by knowing the number of trees and then where to plant these trees. To indicate how many trees are needed to be planted, this study suggested utilizing the SI standard and the 3 30–300 rule guidelines for greenery. &nbsp;<figure id="figure-qfwbelbvppmdr9lq3j"><img id="qfwbelbvppmdr9lq3j" src="https://cdn.durable.co/blocks/38fsJ6FN9vAoE33dwChiEBLyiL8BLMx6XePGDQn5ONKiZhpFc9wRto5cGqY32LsB.png" alt="" title="" class="object-cover bg-gray-100 " style="aspect-ratio: 16/9; object-position: center center;" data-corners="default" data-aspect="16:9" data-caption="" data-positionx="undefined" data-positiony="undefined" data-fullwidth="false" data-mce-src="https://cdn.durable.co/blocks/38fsJ6FN9vAoE33dwChiEBLyiL8BLMx6XePGDQn5ONKiZhpFc9wRto5cGqY32LsB.png" data-mce-style="aspect-ratio: 16/9; object-position: center center;"></figure>Conclusion&nbsp;To answer the research questions, findings showed that urban trees are not adequately protected and managed. Polices, laws, and guidelines are not followed qualitatively. Quantitatively, Duhok is severely under forested, with only about 32,000 trees compared to the estimated need of 3,287,316, more than 100 times the current number, based on two factors only: vehicles and electricity generators. To address these issues, several recommendations were proposed.&nbsp; References:Abdi, A. H. M. (2017). From producers to consumers: The challenges and opportunities of agricultural development in Iraqi Kurdistan. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/317784337Adttsran. (2021, September 23). What are the WHO guidelines on green space? - ISGlobal Ranking of Cities. ISGlobal Ranking of Cities. Retrieved from https://isglobalranking.org/faq-items/what-are-the-who-guidelines-on-green-space/Government of South Australia. (2024). Auditor-General Report 6 of 2024: Urban tree canopy management. Retrieved from https://www.audit.sa.gov.au/reports/urban-tree-canopy-managementHand, K. L., &amp; Doick, K. J. (2019). Understanding the role of urban tree management on ecosystem services. Forest Research. Retrieved from https://cdn.forestresearch.gov.uk/2019/06/frrn039.pdfHanas, B. A. (2024). Assessing the integration and implementation of green spaces conservation of Duhok City Master Plan (Unpublished B.Sc. thesis). University of Duhok.Konijnendijk, C. C. (2022). Evidence-based guidelines for greener, healthier, more resilient neighbourhoods: Introducing the 3–30–300 rule. Journal of Forestry Research, 34(3), 821–830. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11676-022-01523-zKonijnendijk, C. C., Nilsson, K., Randrup, T. B., &amp; Schipperijn, J. (Eds.). (2005). Urban forests and trees: A reference book. Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-27684-XMalkoç, E. (2024, August). City-wide assessment of urban tree cover and land-cover changes in Edirne using web-based tools.Roy, S., Byrne, J., &amp; Pickering, C. (2012). A systematic quantitative review of urban tree benefits, costs, and assessment methods across cities in different climatic zones. Urban Forestry &amp; Urban Greening, 11(4), 351–363. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ufug.2012.06.006SAVI (Sustainable Asset Valuation). (2023, January 26). Tree planting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Retrieved from https://www.iisd.org/savi/project/tree-planting-in-addis-ababa-ethiopia/Albeyboni, D. J. (2025, May). Personal communication.Muhamed, H. N. (2025, May). Personal communication.Sindory, S. (2024, April 30). Personal communication.Zebari, B. (2025, May). Personal communication.

Evaluating urban trees protection and management in Duhok governorate of Kurdistan

IntroductionThe first part of this study explains that most of the Iranian scholarship on the KRG focuses heavily on geopolitical and security threats. Often, the KRG is portrayed as a project supported by the United States and Israel that threatens Iran’s national security. Furthermore, Iranian scholars frequently describe federalism in Iraq as an unstable model, intensifying concerns about its implications for Iran’s ethnic minorities. While some studies view the KRG as a regional opportunity, the majority adopt a threat-based perspective, particularly regarding the 2017 independence referendum. Overall, Iranian academic discourse tends to frame its national security concerns through regional leadership dynamics and internal ethnonational politics, rather than through scholarly inquiry.The second part of this article examines how Iranian academia represents the KRG or Southern Kurdistan’s influence on Eastern Kurdistan (Rojhelat). This topic occupies a distinct space in Iranian scholarly output; Among 103 peer-reviewed articles published in Iranian academic journals over the past decade, 23 directly address the KRG's impact on Kurdish politics and discourse in Rojhelat and the perceived threat to Iran’s national security. The central question of this article is: How do Iranian academic institutions analyze Southern Kurdistan’s role in the Kurdish question in Iran?Broadly, these studies categorize the KRG’s influence on Rojhelat into two domains:Political-Security threats: encouragement of political demands by Rojhelat’s Kurds toward the Iranian central government, and the security concerns these developments pose for Iran’s national stability. Socio-Cultural impacts: the KRG’s impact on the development of Kurdish cultural identity in Rojhelat and the growing social interconnectedness across the border between the two parts of Kurdistan.Nationalism, Federalism, and Autonomy: Bashur as a Political ModelAs discussed in the first section regarding the conceptualization of federalism in Iraq within Iranian academic discourse, the studies often perceive the role and authority of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) as an artificial and imposed system due to the Iraq’s multiethnic composition, its alignment with American democratic agendas and the regional domination of the West, and hence, the KRG is regularly viewed as a source of regional threat—particularly in the aftermath of the Kurdish independence referendum in the Kurdistan Region (Hatami &amp; Saniar 2017; Khaterkha &amp; Pustchini 2022; Farzinrad et al. 2019), as well as the growing ethno-cultural demands of Kurds in Iran (Sajjadi &amp; Amjadian 2011: 70; Pishgahi-Fard &amp; Nasrollahzadeh 2012: 196; Hafiznia 2006: 33).To the extent that the developments in Southern Kurdistan are reflected onto Eastern Kurdistan, Iranian academia maintains the belief that the establishment of a federal system in Iraq and the inclusion of most Kurdish areas under the KRG have elevated federalism as a powerful political paradigm among Kurds in other parts of the Middle East. This political, economic, and cultural evolution has contributed to the shift in the discourse of Kurdish parties and opposition groups in Iran—from calls for “autonomy” to demands for “federalism.” Emphasis is placed on the fact that, in recent years, following the institutionalization of federalism in Iraq and the establishment of the KRG, Kurdish opposition groups in Iran have increasingly advocated federalism as a political and ethnic solution for Iran’s future (Pishgahi-Fard &amp; Nasrollahzadeh 2012: 196). Another study argues that “after the formation of federalism in Iraq, federalist ideas and demands became the main strategic discourse of many Iranian Kurdish parties and even some Kurdish and non-Kurdish elites have supported this aspiration” (Mohammadi et al. 2023: 91). This study also notes that “recognition of Iranian Kurdish opposition parties in Iraqi Kurdistan due to their ethnic and linguistic affiliations enables them to more rapidly expand their influence and activities among Iranian Kurdish society” (Ibid, 94).A key theme in Iranian scholarship is the perceived impact of Southern Kurdistan’s emergence as a political entity on shaping Kurdish nationalist aspirations in Iran. Iranian researchers emphasize that the creation of the KRG has revitalized Kurdish national identity and strengthened Kurdish political culture across the broader Kurdish geography (Bahadori 2016; Pishgahi-Fard &amp; Nasrollahzadeh 2012: 203). A scholar defines the Kurdish areas of the Middle East as part of a “Kurdistan System,” viewing the Southern Kurdistan as the center or core of this system, since 1991 functioning as a regional pioneer and dynamic force for Kurdish nationalism (Hafiznia 2006: 23–30). In fact, the political, cultural, media, and economic developments in the KRG have drawn the attention of Kurdish public opinion in other parts of Kurdistan. Accordingly, some scholars conclude that the internationalization of the Kurdish question and the establishment of formal and media ties, increasing political, cultural, and economic demands are among the results of these influences (Pishgahi-Fard &amp; Nasrollahzadeh 2012: 203–204). And, Southern Kurdistan is now becoming “a center for promoting and exporting such ideas to neighboring countries” (Hafiznia 2006: 22). For these reasons, scholars view Southern Kurdistan’s impacts on Iranian Kurds as a serious threat, arguing it has intensified “separatist” and “nationalist” tendencies among Kurds in Iran (Bojmehrani &amp; Poursalami 2016; Sajjadi &amp; Amjadian 2011: 73), which poses “a challenge to Iran’s national security and territorial integrity” (Farzinrad et al. 2019: 205).In addition, scholars attribute a portion of nationalist and autonomist sentiments in Rojhelat to a growing awareness of the KRG’s developmental achievements compared to Rojhelat’s underdevelopment under a centralized state. They argue that the proximity of the KRG to Rojhelat, combined with local underdevelopment and poverty, especially in Kurdish provinces, fosters negative implications for Iran’s national security (Nasri &amp; Rezaei 2020; Kiani &amp; Amiri 2019; Mottaghi 2016). Therefore, in their view, the best solution to counter the dangers posed by KRG autonomy or the risk of independence lies in improving living standards in Rojhelat and border regions through economic and cultural development, as well as increasing local Kurdish participation in economic and administrative governance (Nasri &amp; Rezaei 2020: 51–52).According to these studies, the impact of the KRG transformed the scope of Kurdish political engagement in Iran. Several studies note the influence of Southern Kurdistan’s achievements on raising political expectations, electoral behavior, and the articulation of demands by ethnic movements and popular protests in Rojhelat against the centralized Iranian state. For example, in the parliamentary domain, it is argued that political developments in the KRG even influenced Kurdish reformists. During the 2005 Iranian presidential elections, Kurdish reformist movements reportedly presented some demands to candidates included formal Kurdish-language education, the return of exiled Kurds to Kurdistan, freedom of Kurdish press, halting regional underdevelopment, and increasing regional and national political participation, all of which were shaped by the experience of federalism in Iraq (Mohammadi et al. 2010: 132).&nbsp;The political influence of the KRG is also evident in events such as the 2005 Mahabad unrest, the formation of a Kurdish parliamentary faction composed of both Shia and Sunni MPs—prioritizing national identity over sectarian affiliation—, the public enthusiasm in Rojhelat (especially in Sanandaj and Mahabad) at the declaration of federalism in Iraq and the election of Jalal Talabani as Iraq’s president, and, conversely, the subsequent decline in Kurdish participation in Iran’s Islamic Consultative Assembly (2003), parliamentary elections (2004), and the 2005 presidential elections. All of these are interpreted as examples of the KRG’s advancing political influence (Hafiznia 2006: 23; Mohammadi et al. 2023: 95; Mohammadi et al. 2010). On this subject, another researcher has concluded that:<blockquote> “The recent developments in Iraqi Kurdistan have politically disillusioned the Kurds from participating in the elections of the Islamic Republic, and from a security perspective, have further radicalized Kurdish national rights movements in certain Kurdish cities. All of these have had a direct impact on the stability of Iran’s western border regions” (Kiani &amp; Amiri 2019: 13).</blockquote> Iranian academia holds the belief that the primary threat posed by the autonomy and potential independence of the KRG concerns Iran’s national security, as political and social mobilization in the border regions—potentially “increasing the political and cultural demands of the Kurds in Iran against the central government” (Farzinrad et al. 2019: 205). Therefore, the majority of these studies interpret the influence of Southern Kurdistan on Rojhelat through a negative lens and propose various political, security, and cultural recommendations to mitigate these impacts and restrain the growth of nationalist movements in Rojhelat. Cross-border Connections: Socio-cultural ImpactsApart from political and security discourse, Iranian academia simultaneously emphasizes the cultural and social implications of the KRG’s political and cultural development on Eastern Kurdistan. According to analyses, a significant part of these effects has been facilitated by social ties and Kurdish media, which intensified after the institutionalization of the KRG. Rojhelat and Southern (Bashur) Kurdistan have long-standing and reciprocal social connections, including family relations—especially among border towns and villages—, ethnic and sectarian overlaps, and shared cultural and social legacies. These connections were reinforced after the KRG’s political and economic transformations and the relative openness of Rojhelat during the reform era (1996–2005) (Hafeznia 2006: 22). Moreover, what strengthens this dynamic is "the presence of linguistic, cultural, and emotional ties between Iraqi Kurds and Kurdish-inhabited regions of Iran on one hand, and the legal-political authority of Iraqi Kurds on the other" (Bozhmehrani &amp; Pour-Eslami 2014: 106).The cultural development of the KRG has had a visible impact on the cultural identity of Kurds in Iran. The KRG’s influence in terms of intellectual life and the promotion and dissemination of Kurdish culture and identity is widely acknowledged. Examples include the establishment of hundreds of schools and several universities that educate Kurdish students from various parts of Kurdistan; the widespread publication of Kurdish-language print media on diverse socio-political topics; hosting numerous conferences and seminars to honor scientific, intellectual, and political Kurdish figures; and inviting literary and intellectual elites from other parts of Kurdistan. According to Iranian researchers, this cultural flourishing has constructed an idealized image of Kurdistan among Rojhelat Kurds, leading them to imagine a similar future for themselves inspired by Southern Kurdistan’s cultural production. Thus, from a cultural perspective, the KRG’s autonomy has the potential to strengthen Kurdish identity and culture and to intensify political and cultural demands toward the central Iranian government (Hafeznia 2006: 22; Mohammadi et al. 2010: 143). In this context, one study cites the "Galawêj Festival" as an example, stating:<blockquote> “The organization of literary, artistic, and cultural festivals in Iraqi Kurdistan—and the facilitation of Iranian Kurdish artists’ participation in annual programs such as the Galawêj Festival—as well as invitations and support for Kurdish music groups from Iran, and their widespread promotion via television broadcasts from the Kurdistan Region, all function as a soft and symbolic challenge to the Islamic Republic” (Bozhmehrani &amp; Pour-Eslami 2014: 104).</blockquote> The scholarship also highlights the KRG’s media capacity and the openness afforded to media activity as major drivers behind the internationalization of Kurdish-related issues, including those concerning Kurds in Iran. The territory of the KRG has become a hub connecting Kurdistan with international and state systems, international and local media, NGOs, and intellectuals. In fact, the shared linguistic and cultural identity has made KRG-based TV channels—especially since their significant expansion after 2005—more attractive and influential among Iranian Kurds, who often lack such cultural outlets. These Kurdish media outlets have familiarized Rojhelat audiences with the history, politics, and culture of Kurdistan, thereby weakening, to some extent, the internalized sense of "Iranian-ness" among the younger generations in Eastern Kurdistan. Furthermore, the broadcast of news and content regarding Kurdish activism via domestic, regional, and global satellite channels has contributed to raising awareness and intensifying nationalist demands among Iranian Kurds (Hafeznia 2006: 23; Bozhmehrani &amp; Pour-Eslami 2014: 103).&nbsp;In general, Iranian academia emphasizes that the establishment of numerous Kurdish radio-television channels, media networks, and the launch of thousands of Kurdish websites and blogs—with cultural, political, and historical relevance to Rojhelat—has played a significant role in this process. Accordingly, these studies conclude that the political trajectories and developments in Kurdish regions of the Middle East intersect with one another. They are bound by shared cultural, emotional, intellectual, and political affinities, such that any fundamental change in one part will inevitably affect the others. ConclusionThe analysis examines the multifaceted impact of the KRG on Eastern Kurdistan (Rojhelat), focusing on both political-security and socio-cultural dimensions from the Iranian academic perspective. Iranian scholars identify the KRG as a significant political actor that has encouraged Kurdish demands for federalism and autonomy within Iran, thereby raising security concerns for the Iranian state. The institutionalization of federalism in Iraq and the KRG’s achievements have inspired Kurdish opposition groups in Iran to shift from autonomy to federalism demands, contributing to heightened nationalist and separatist sentiments. Politically, these developments have affected Kurdish electoral behavior and protest movements, challenging Iran’s territorial integrity.Culturally, the KRG’s advancements in education, media, and cultural events have strengthened Kurdish identity and social ties across the border. Kurdish-language media and cultural festivals foster a shared sense of nationalism, which Iranian scholars view as potentially undermining Iranian national cohesion. The proliferation of Kurdish media outlets from the KRG serves as a vehicle for raising awareness of Kurdish issues and expanding nationalist discourse in Rojhelat. Consequently, Iranian academia frames the KRG’s socio-cultural influence as a “soft challenge” that complements its political impact, intensifying pressures on Iran’s western border regions and complicating national security. Referencesبوژمهرانی، حسن و مهدی پور‌اسلامی (2014). 'تهدیدهای نرم خودمختاری اقلیم کردستان عراق و تأثیر آن بر کردهای ایران'. جامعه‌شناسی سیاسی جهان اسلام 2(4):87–110.بوژمهرانی، حسن و مهدی پوراسلامی (2016). 'خود مختاری کردستان عراق و چالش های پیش روی جمهوری اسلامی ایران'. علوم و فنون مرزی 14(6):43–76.پیشگاهی فرد، زهرا و بهرام نصرالهی زاده (2012). 'آثار تشکیل حکومت ناحیه ای کردستان عراق بر نواحی کردنشین ایران'. جغرافیا و برنامه ریزی محیطی 23(246):189–206.حاتمی، محمدرضا و مکاییل سانیار (2017). 'همه پرسی اقلیم کردستان؛ منابع و تنگناهای تشکیل دولت مستقل'، مطالعات راهبردی 20(276):85–111.حافظ‌نیا، محمدرضا (2006). 'تاثیر خودگردانی کردهای شمال عراق بر کشورهای همسایه'. تحقیقات جغرافیایی 21(483):5–36.خاطرخواه آناقیز، علی و زهره پوستینچی (2022). 'اسرائیل؛ استقلال خواهی کردستان عراق و تهدیدات آن برای امنیت ملی جمهوری اسلامی ایران'. &nbsp;پژوهش های روابط بین الملل 12(4):39–67.ساجدی، امیر و فرامرز امجدیان (2011). 'تاثیر فدرالیسم کردستان عراق بر هنجارهای سیاسی و قومیتی کردهای ایران'، دانشنامه (80):57–80.فرزین راد، رویا؛ یونس فروزان، عبدالرضا عالیشاهی و سیدعلی مجیدی نژاد (2019). 'بررسی مسئله همه پرسی استقلال اقلیم کردستان عراق و تاثیر آن بر امنیت ملی جمهوری اسلامی ایران'. مطالعات راهبردی سیاست گذاری عمومی (مطالعات راهبردی جهانی شدن) 9(31):195–210.قدیر، نصری و داود رضایی (2020). 'مهم ترین تهدیدات فراروی جمهوری اسلامی ایران در اقلیم کردستان عراق'. مطالعات بین رشته ای دانش راهبردی 9(37):168–97.کیانی، جواد و سروش امیری (2019). 'پیامدهای تغییر ژئوپلیتیکی اقلیم کردستان عراق در امنیت مرزهای غربی ایران'. پژوهشنامه مطالعات مرزی 7(325):1–19متقی، افشین (2016). 'تحلیل تطبیقی احساس امنیت در قلمروهای مرزی (نمونه موردی؛ کردستان ایران و کردستان عراق)'. نگرش های نو در جغرافیای انسانی (جعرافیای انسانی) 8(4):29–42.محمدی، حمیدرضا؛ حسین خالدی و ندیمه سلیم نژاد (2010). 'خودگردانی شمال عراق و تاثیرات آن بر حرکتهای قوم گرایانه پیرامونی'. ژئوپلیتیک 6(117):112–48. محمدی، مجید؛ احمد بخشایش؛ محمد توحیدفام و علی اکبر امینی (2023). 'احزاب ضدانقلاب کُردی ایران؛ پیامدهای دمکراسی انجمنی کردستان عراق بر احزاب ضد انقلاب کُردی ایران'. پژوهش های راهبردی سیاست 11(43):73–106

Kurdish Regional Government in the Iranian Academia- Part 2

The Intersections of Geography and Language

The Kurdistan Regional Government in Iranian Academic Research

Aspirations and Capabilities: Drivers of Kurdish Youth Migration to Europe in the 2020s

Dam Policies and the Colonial Condition of Kurdistan

NSI - ENG

research

Open Sans

Work Sans

Nishtman Strategy Institute uses cookies to ensure you get the best experience on our site.

Research Articles

Evaluating urban trees protection and management in Duhok...

Kurdish Regional Government in the Iranian Academia- Part 2

The Intersections of Geography and Language

The Kurdistan Regional Government in Iranian Academic Res...

Aspirations and Capabilities: Drivers of Kurdish Youth Mi...

Dam Policies and the Colonial Condition of Kurdistan