Dam Policies and the Colonial Condition of Kurdistan

Introduction

Although environmental degradation and destruction are global concerns, the critical literature on ‘political ecology’ highlights that such generalized descriptions fail to explain the socio-political and structural relationships, different mechanisms, and specific goals behind ‘ecocide’ in regions with distinct historical and cultural characteristics compared to the dominant societies or political powers. 

To understand these cases, concepts such as ‘eco-apartheid’, ‘environmental racism’ and ‘environmental colonialism’ are employed to explain the structural and political complexities involved in destruction  of marginalized ethnic, national, and racial groups’ ecosystems. Colonialism and environmental racism refer to the acts and policies of one state towards another state or a subaltern community it controls, aiming to exploit its natural resources under the pretext of bringing economic development or social stability to those areas. However, it results in the economic growth of dominant or central regions at the expense of the marginalized areas.

This critical approach asserts that environmental destruction is not the result of growth-oriented policies, but rather an integral part of ‘racial capitalism’ within nation-states that develop at the expense of the de-development of subalternized nations or regions. These policies disproportionately expose linguistically and culturally marginalized areas to severe environmental risks and damages, which can be considered a form of "internal colonialism."

Moreover, ‘extractive colonialism’ refers to the practice of exploiting the natural resources and labor in colonized regions to the benefit of the colonial power, often with significant socio-economic and environmental consequences for colonized lands.

What characterizes this form of colonialism is the extraction without recompensation and without improving conditions for the region’s inhabitants. This process frequently includes exploitative labor practices and the decline of local autonomy. Central to extractive colonialism is the question of sovereignty, which determines the space for   resource extraction. This process is not solely about capital accumulationbut also posesses symbolic and racial dimensions that reinforce exploitative practices. The intersection of violence and resource extraction defies these dynamics and often leads to the marginalization of the indigenous populations in colonized regions. Thus, the environmental crises in the ethno-national regions do not result solely from the mismanagement of natural resources. Rather, they are the direct result of a combination of the capitalist state and colonial practices imposed upon specific regions.

In relation to Kurdistan, these concepts offer new perspectives to analyze and understand Kurdistan's environment, which is under the hegemony and control of four nation-states in the Middle East. This paper, subsequent to outlining the colonial condition of Kurdistan and its relation to environmental concerns, examines the hydro-politics of the Iranian state and its managerial politics toward Kurdistan’s natural resources. Specifically, it examines the case of dams as a strategy of de-development in Rojhelat (Eastern Kurdistan)and a threat to the region’s socio-economic stability.

The environment of Kurdistan in the shadow of Extractive Colonialism

Kurdistan, due to its sensitive geopolitical position as a buffer zone between the Safavid and Ottoman empires and a region rich in natural resources and mineral wealth, has made it a target for occupiers. Recent scholarship interprets the Ottoman Empire’s treatment of Ottoman Kurdistan’s resources and wealth as a form of extractive colonialism. This concept emphasizes the fundamentally unequal relations built on the extraction and export of resources from a region for the benefit of the imperial metropoles, leading to erosion of the local autonomy of Kurdish principalities as the state exerted control over resources.

In the modern Middle East, the political geography of Kurdistan was a centre of inter-states regional competition. Although Kurdistan once enjoyed relative political autonomy, its geopolitical division following World War I, through the ‘Sykes-Picot Treaty’, led to its colonization and occupation by four newly established states, i.e., Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Syria. The Kurdish experience in these states can be described as a form of internal colonialism characterized by subjugation and marginalization of Kurds through policies of economic de-development, othering, securitization, and militarization. Indeed, the status of Kurdistan as a colony is not a novel condition. Rather, it can be traced back to the 16th century when it became a buffer zone between the Ottoman and Safavid powers, shaping political conditions to this day. 

The colonial administration over Kurdistan’s natural resources by these four dominant states coincided with the development of capitalist relations in these countries and the intensification of internal colonialism in Kurdistan. Throughout the 20th century, the exploitation of Kurdistan’s natural resources and the destruction of its environment intensified as the colonial states initiated large-scale projects involving energy, minerals, agriculture, infrastructure, and investments. To illustrate, in 1950, the pursuit of systematic exploitation and destruction of Kurdistan’s environment began, with the launch of extensive and costly dam construction and extraction projects (e.g., oil, minerals, and natural resources) by the 1970s.

These projects resulted in mass displacement and migration from rural areas, reinforcing internal colonialism through the dual processes of economic dispossession and cultural assimilation. The conditions fostered economic impoverishment, marginalization, and displacement for religious and ethnic communities. 

As such, in the following parts, the construction of dams as a hydro-political tool in Iran within the context of environmental colonialism in Kurdistan will be examined. 

The Colonial Hydro-Politics of Iran against Marginalized Regions and Nations

In the past decades, particularly toward the end of the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988),  the Iranian state began investing in large and small dam construction projects to gain control over border rivers, aiming at overcoming water shortages and leveraging water as a tool for regional diplomacy,  especially in relation to Turkey, Iraq, Afghanistan etc). 

Iran’s water scarcity management on a national level is based on specific mechanisms and strategies. Since the 1990s, Iran has implemented hundreds of environmentally damaging projects, including dams, agricultural development, and mining initiatives. The most important and comprehensive projects are “the border rivers management” and  “ inter-basin water transformation”. In practice, large water transfer infrastructure and tunnels have been built to facilitate water flow for dams and inter-basin water transfer projects, transporting water from the Zagros mountain range, covering the provinces of Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari, Khuzestan, Kurdistan, and Lorestan, to central regions. The primary goal is to supply water for heavy industries and water-intensive enterprises in Isfahan, Kerman, and Yazd, as well as to support agricultural development in these areas. This is the primary approach to managing the water crisis and tensions in the country. In this way, Iran's hydro-politics in addressing national water shortages and supplying water to central regions affected by droughts, relies on transferring water from the northern, northwestern, and southwestern regions of Iran (the water-supplying areas) to the dry and desert regions of the country.

According to official data, Iran currently has 172 operational dams, 672 dams in the final stages, 120 under construction, and 176 in planning. Of these, more than 250 dams are located in the provinces of Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari, Khuzestan, and Kurdistan. Regarding Kurdistan, many of the dams in Kurdistan, Ilam, Kermanshah, and the Kurdish-populated areas of West Azerbaijan province primarily serve to manage water crises and tensions in central Iran while sustaining and expanding economic activities (industry and agriculture) in central regions. This is done without considering the substantial socio-economic and ecological consequences for Kurdistan, which, despite being a major water supplier, remains economically and socially disadvantaged.

Dams in Eastern Kurdistan: Policies to Plunder and De-development

The Iranian government’s racial policies, discrimination, and aggression in the realm of hydro-politics and environmental terms have been destructive to Kurdistan’s ecosystem. For instance, Kurdistan province in Iran contains five major rivers: Karkheh, Qezel Owzan, Sirwan, Little Zab, and Zarrineh. Despite this abundance, the province suffers from a critical water crisis, withSanandaj, the provincial capital, being among the three Iranian cities with the most severe water shortages and unhealthiest urban water networks.

Currently, more than 10 dams are operational in Kurdistan province, with approximately 26 additional large and small dams in various stages of construction, implementation, or research. Expanding the scope to Kermanshah, Ilam, and the Kurdish-populated areas of West Azerbaijan province, Kurdistan holds over 50 dams in total.

In recent decades, 13 dams, currently active, have been built solely on the Sirwan River to complete four major water transfer projects beyond Kurdistan's borders. These projects divert water away from border regions to central areas.

As mentioned earlier, the primary purpose of dam construction in Kurdistan is not to develop agriculture and industry in Kurdistan but to develop the surrounding provinces. The destruction of Kurdistan’s ecosystem and ecological balance due to the river flow diversion —especially the Sirwan River—is a clear indication of Iran’s colonial approach toward Kurdish territories. The environmental impact of these projects reinforces the center-periphery relations, where Kurdistan is exploited for its natural resources while receiving little to no benefit.

The largest, most controversial, and most impactful dam project in Kurdistan is the “Daryan Dam”. Built on the Sirwan River in Paveh, Kermanshah province, the dam’s construction  faced widespread opposition from local communities, environmental activists, and non-governmental organizations in Eastern Kurdistan and across the region. For example, between 2008 and 2014, the campaigns “Save Kani Bil” and “Save the Tigris and Iraqi Marshes” were launched in protest. The construction of the dam poses a serious threat to the biological diversity and social integration of the region. 

Environmentally, it has caused severe damage to the Sirwan River and its surrounding ecosystem, disrupting ecological balance and altering the natural flow of water, thereby changing the climate in the Hawraman region. The Daryan Dam has not only severely damaged Kani Bil, a spiritual site for the local populace, but it has also submerged the 6,000-year-old village, erasing an archaeologically and historically important site. Moreover, the construction of the dam led to the displacement of hundreds of families. Parts of the villages of Hajij, Ruwar, and Daryan were submerged, and at least hundreds of families lost their homes, lands, and livelihoods. Many were forcibly displaced to cities like Marivan, Paveh, and Kermanshah. 

From an economic perspective, the Daryan Dam has had devastating consequences for the local communities along the Sirwan River, particularly in Hawraman. The dam’s water diversion and restricted flow have severely damaged local livelihoods, as the economic resources and income of the villagers  largely depend on agriculture, horticulture, livestock farming, and similar activities. A significant portion of the land and pastures in the region have been submerged due to the dam, or access to them is either restricted or completely blocked for villagers. This has led to a decline in the economic income level of livestock farming in the villages located along the Sirwan River and the mountains of Shaho and Kosalan. Briefly, the Daryan Dam exemplifies the de-development of Rojhelat in economic, social, and environmental terms.

As a result, the implementation of the dam project has faced substantial criticism from environmental activists and experts in the field of Kurdistan’s ecosystem. They are of the opinion that the dam construction has caused a catastrophic disruption of Kurdistan's ecosystem and natural resources, with water diversion projects contributing to environmental damage, crises economic underdevelopment, poverty,  and social instability in Kurdistan. In response, the government has securitized the demands of civilians and society, arresting and judging civil activists as political and security threats.

Weaponizing Water: The Threat of Iran’s Dams to the Socio-Economic Stability of Kurdistan Regional Government 

The key feature of Iran’s dam projects in Kurdistan is not only the de-development and environmental instability they bring about, but also their socio-political threat to the Kurds in Iraq. Iran unilaterally exploits water resources and restricts rights to access water for downstream regions. Over the past two decades, the Iranian government has not only limited the flow of water from major shared water bodies with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), but has also leveraged it as a political and diplomatic bargaining chip against it. For example, there is currently a series of large and small dams along the Little Zab and Sirwan Rivers, where water flow to southern Kurdistan has been limited or blocked. Ultimately, the reduction in water flow from the Sirwan River - known as the Diyala River in Iraq - will have a significant negative impact on the people and structures in southern Iraq.

In relation to the KRG, the Daryan Dam has more severe impacts compared to other dams. The villages along the Sirwan River in the Kurdistan Region, as well as the cities of Kalar and Halabja, already experiencing droughts and water shortages, are now facing even greater water scarcity due to the Dam. Moreover, the flow of the Sirwan River in the Kurdistan Region has decreased by 60%. Iran’s limitations and lack of accountability in granting water rights to the region have a direct impact on hundreds of thousands of people in the provinces of Sulaymaniyah and Halabja.

Additionally, the reduction in the river's water flow has significantly impacted agriculture, hydroelectric power, and fishing in the Kurdistan Region. According to data, if the water flow to southern Kurdistan continues to decline, over 3,200 hectares of agricultural land in Halabja, Said Sadiq, and Darbandikhan will be lost. Reduction in agricultural production threatens the food security of Southern Kurdistan, increasing economic dependence on agricultural imports from Iran. Another report warns that around 750 hectares of farmland and 400 fish farming projects in the Kurdistan Region will face crises. 

In recent years, the KRG and all sectors of Halabja province, including political parties, civil society organizations, and non-governmental organizations, have expressed dissatisfaction with the construction of the Daryan Dam in Iran and the denial of water rights from the Sirwan and Little Zab rivers. By weaponizing water as a political and military tool against Southern Kurdistan, Iran directly targets the socio-economic livelihood of cities and villages in the region.

Conclusion

In this analysis It is discussed that the management approach of natural resources, particularly water, in marginalized regions of nation-states with ethnic, cultural, and linguistic diversity, reflects various forms of internal colonialism. It has been emphasized that the geopolitical location of Kurdistan in the Middle East has driven dominant states to adopt various mechanisms and strategies for managing the region's transboundary water resources, prioritizing the interests of their central regions, which was discussed as a form of extractive colonialism. The extraction of natural resources like water through the construction of massive dams and inter-basin water transfer projects in Kurdistan and the Zagros Mountains has led to economic, social, and environmental disruption, serving as a form of de-development politics and environmental racism. 

Therefore, due to the colonial division of Kurdistan across four states, any policy regarding the management and extraction of Kurdistan's water resources entails severe ramifications for other parts of Kurdistan. It is emphasized that Iran's dam policy in Kurdistan directly and indirectly threatens the economic and social stability of the Kurdistan Region, while water is weaponized as political and diplomatic pressure. Thus, the dam policy can be seen as part of the ongoing colonial condition imposed on Kurdistan.

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