Aspirations and Capabilities: Drivers of Kurdish Youth Migration to Europe in the 2020s

1.1 Introduction 

In the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (the KRI, or Bashur), migration seems to be a phenomenon on the rise. Videos of dinghies carrying Kurdish youth to Europe through the Mediterranean Sea circulate commonly on social media. News of young Kurds dying or disappearing en route make headlines annually. The persistence of Kurdish migration prompted the government of the United Kingdom (UK) to issue a digital campaign in Sorani Kurdish, dissuading Kurds from Iraq from seeking asylum on the island (McDonald, 2025). The campaign’s slogan, “If we arrest you, we will expel you”, speaks to the persistence and securitization of Kurdish migration simultaneously. 

As quotes from the British campaign show, the migrant journeys towards a better life, towards economic security or freedom, can be fatal - “People disappeared into sea". Or, that the life envisioned abroad is often a mirage - “I was promised a well-paid job, instead I was enslaved” (McDonald, 2025). Regardless of these deterrents and the securitization measures taken by asylum-receiving countries, a notable number of Kurdish youth are exiting the region. This begets the question: “What are the drivers and facilitators of Kurdish youth migration to Europe in the 2020s?”.  This question guides this paper into discussing the region's political and socio-economic landscape, and personal ambitions as determinants in migration decision-making. 

This brief will argue that the economic constraints facing Kurdish youth are a key determinant of migration. Economic stagnation, informal clientelist arrangements, combined with the lack of political pluralism all shape the present and future of Kurdish youth. Currently, Bashuri Kurdish youth seem to be losing hope in achieving their aspirations or stability at home. This dimension brings in the question of personal motivations and agency into the migration decision-making process. Hence, this paper not only considers the structural causes engendering migration, but also individual motivations, perceptions and abilities. Towards this end, the paper utilizes a push-pull model and the aspirations-capabilities theory of migration. 

1.2 A Background of Kurdish Migration Patterns 

Historically, the migration patterns of Kurds in Iraq have been driven by security, political, and economic factors. Genocide, forced displacement, governmental persecution, embargoes, and conflict have all engendered migration. Indeed, waves of migration can be categorized chronologically, as Erland Paasche (2020) does in the following manner. 

Paasche identifies that elite pioneers in Bashur initiated migration in 1974, lasting until 1991. Migrants of this era were political or military elites fleeing persecution from the Ba'athist dictatorship. The second wave of asylum migration occurred from 1992 to 1998, and comprised migrants from varied socioeconomic levels (Paasche, 2020;198). The third wave, from 1999 until 2014, is less straightforward. Within this timeframe, the region enjoyed relative stability, political recognition, and economic growth. For Paasche, migration in this era resulted from opportunity seeking and the normativity of migration. However, the rate of returnees during this period was remarkable. Bakr (2022;4) and Aghapouri (2023) observe the phenomenon of reverse migration whereby diaspora Kurds returned to the region from 2000s to 2013. 

Returns halted in 2014. In the context of an economic crisis, disputes with Baghdad, and the war with the Islamic State, another wave of migration ensued (Ozdemir and Alaca, 2021; Romano, 2019; Jaff, 2023). Ahmed, Yassen, and Mustafa (2023, 416) situate this wave from 2014 to 2022. Here, the authors suggest that families migrated in search of permanently improved life conditions and financial wellbeing, which seem unattainable at home. 

This assertion aligns with the broader migration trends in the era of globalization, indicating that income and opportunity gaps between developed and developing countries shape the movement of people (Ozden and Schiff 2007; Ratha, 2014). The current literature on migration from Iraq details security and economic concerns as the main drivers (Khoury, 2024; Bakr, 2023). The push-pull model and neoclassical models of migration describe that migration occurs if the benefits outweigh the costs (Haas, 2021), which is consistent with the historical patterns of Kurdish migration.

2. Conceptual Framework 

2.1 Push and Pull Model

Often, migration is understood through a rational-choice perspective. A predominant view in the literature is that migration decisions are made by individuals seeking to maximize satisfaction or income. Push and pull models, introduced by Lee (1966), present that migrant movements are driven by negative (push) factors at home, which move migrants toward positive (pull) factors in other locations. Through this perspective, migration decision-making is rather determined by external or impersonal forces (Ahmed et al. 2023). Indeed, push-pull models suggest that migration results from income and opportunity differences between home countries and destination areas (Hein de Haas,2018) and that migrants make cost-benefit calculations to maximize their interests. While the push-pull model holds great explanatory power, it does not suffice in examining agency at the individual level. Therein enters the following model.

2.2. Aspirations and Capabilities Framework 

The aspirations-capabilities framework, borrowed from the theorist Haan de Haas (2021), suggests that local structures and ideas about the destination area endow individuals and groups with opportunities and constraints that impact people's capabilities and aspirations. Individuals’ perceptions may encourage or deter them from migrating. 

"The entire set of structural conditions at home and in imagined migration destinations creates complex opportunity structures, endowing different individuals and social groups with various sets of negative and positive liberties, which, depending on how these structural conditions affect people's capabilities and aspirations and how people perceive these conditions through their social, cultural and personal lenses, may, or may not, make them decide to migrate."
 

(Haas, 2021, 27) 
 

Haas posits aspirations as having to do with people's life aspirations, visions of the future, and desired opportunities. If an individual's local life conditions are constraining and do not match their life aspirations, they may migrate. However, if one perceives that aspirations could be fulfilled at home (e.g, starting a business, joining a resistance movement), migration may not occur. According to Haas, aspirations translate into migration if individuals lose hope in future change, if their life goals cannot be fulfilled at home, or if they believe that better opportunities are available abroad.

On the other hand, capabilities refer to capital: financial, human, and social resources. Capabilities, such as having the required financial means or social connections, are needed to migrate. For reference, increased knowledge about migration opportunities or obtaining  a university degree are capabilities that make individuals believe migration is feasible for them. Briefly, capabilities instill knowledge and self-confidence that one could successfully migrate, e.g., by acquiring a visa or finding a job in the destination area.

2.3 Applying the Frameworks to the KRI 

In the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, push factors prompting migration include the economic phenomena of delayed salaries, corruption, an underdeveloped private sector, a lack of employment opportunities, in addition to the lack of political pluralism to address popular grievances. These conditions shape and constrain opportunities and freedoms; thus, they impact people's perceptions of life in the Kurdistan Region and the extent to which their aspirations seem attainable. In contrast, pull factors are attractive conditions that are perceived to exist in destination areas. Kurds migrating to the West are pulled by employment opportunities, the protection of human rights, social services and welfare benefits, and political freedoms. The pull factors are connected to people's aspirations.

To contextualize the push-pull and aspirations-capabilities frameworks to the KRI, this paper argues that the factors of push and pull, combined with people's aspirations and capabilities, act as facilitators that foster social conditions engendering migration.

3. Methodology and Data 

This paper combines a push-pull model and an aspirations-capabilities framework while employing thematic and content analysis. The data used is both quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative data assesses migration rates. The qualitative data pulls insights from previous but contemporary interviews and focus group discussions to understand individuals' aspirations, motivations, perceptions, and capabilities.

The interview data is derived from:

1. Escaping From Duopoly Rule: How a Two-party System Drives Iraqi Kurdish Migration En Masse? by Mera Jasm Bakr (2022). Bakr's work draws its analysis from 12 semi-structured focus group discussions (FGD) in 12 key areas of the Kurdistan Region from November to December 2021. 94 individuals, of which 25.5% were women, ranging in age from 16 to late 30s, participated in the FGDs.

2. Economic Drivers of Youth Political Discontent in Iraq: The Voice of Young People in Kurdistan, Baghdad, Basra, and Thi-Qar by Jiyad, Schillings, and Küçükkeleş (2021). This research is based on in-depth Skype interviews with 20 young people from the Kurdistan Region-Iraq (KRI). The interviewees were selected to represent a diverse group of people in terms of their geographic distribution, socio-economic conditions, and political views. 7 of the interviewees are female, 8 are students, and 2 are unemployed. They are all within the age group 20-30.

3. Youth Migration Gains and Losses: A Critical Analysis of Economic Perspectives in the Case of the Raparin Administration in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq by Ahmed and Yassen (2023). Twenty wealthy and middle-income families were chosen for face-to-face interviews by the researchers.

4. The root causes of Kurdish Iraqi migration: Early warnings of an impending youthquake in the KRI by Romain Lepla (2022). Kurdish youth were interviewed from various parts of the Kurdish Region of Iraq (KRI). 

4. Kurdish Migration to Europe 

4.1 Data Presentation 

There is no official data on emigration rates from Erbil or Baghdad (Ozdemir and Alaca, 2021). Estimates can be gathered from NGOs, media sites, and social media posts of illicit migration journeys. 

According to estimates of the Lutka Foundation for Refugee and Displaced Affairs, nearly 800,000 individuals have emigrated from Iraq and the KRI since 2015 (Cited in Mustafah, 2024). Additionally, Rudaw estimates that 20,000 individuals emigrated from the KRI in 2023 (Ibid). Further, according to the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, the annual average of emigrants from the KRI is 32,000 individuals (Ibid). 

The European Commission (2024) illustrates that in 2023, Iraqi nationals ranked 11th in nationalities seeking asylum. The Council on Foreign Relations shows that in 2023, there were  5,475 detections of unauthorized border crossings from Iraq. While it is ascertained that Kurds make up a large chunk of refugees and asylum-seekers in Europe (Adamson et al., 2024;523), it is difficult to extract a precise number of Kurds in Europe, because governments do not collect data on specific Kurdish populations in their countries and statistics are gathered by country of origin or citizenship  (Adamson et al., 2024, 523; Lazier 1996,193-194). 

Moreover, Eurostat presents that Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran – countries with significant Kurdish populations – are in the top ten asylum-seeking countries in Europe (Quoted in Adamson et al.,523). In addition, the Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (2021) estimates that from 2014 to 2020, over 30% of asylum seekers from Syria, and 70% of asylum seekers from Iraq claimed a Kurdish identity. 

 Notably, the latest unofficial and preliminary data acquired from Rudaw (2025) suggests that migration is decreasing in 2025, with over 1,500 migrants from January to March of this year. 

4.2 Aspirations as Push Factors 

The numbers above reveal a prevalent desire to migrate, driven by the region's political and socio-economic conditions. Partly, what underpins the conditions is the duopoly party rule. Since 2006, Kurdistan has been officially split between the two ruling parties - the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). 

This political and territorial fragmentation implies separate security forces and separate budgets for the parties' respective territories. Unsurprisingly, this arrangement reinforces party control to the detriment of democratic consolidation. In this context, the parties have expanded client networks and patronage systems within their territories, spurring two distinct social classes that limit opportunities for the non-connected. In turn, this creates conditions that stratify society and limit upward mobility and employment opportunities, thereby engendering migration.  

Duopoly party rule is not viewed favorably by Kurdish youth. In the interviews of Jiyad et al. (2021), participants regarded party dominance as a weakness of the KRI, rendering it more vulnerable to economic shocks. Meanwhile, Bakr's (2023), participants expressed resentment of economic power being held by the top elites and their children. One participant, a returnee from Belarus who works as a street vendor, asks: "Why does the son of a politician who is even younger than me have a car, and my entire family cannot afford to buy a car?”. This simple statement indicates the social stratification plaguing Kurdish society. Power and wealth are palpably and visibly reserved in the hands of a few elites and their clients, while the average Kurdish individual persists on less than 300,000 IQD per month (The National Context, 2025). 

A corresponding matter is the scarcity of job opportunities. Dr. Gunter, the author of ‘The Political Economy of Iraq (2013)’ spoke in AUIS in 2016, stating that 20% of the population was then unemployed then and that 70,000 jobs would need to be created annually to stop the expansion of unemployment. Further, Sabri (2024), in a review of the literature, concludes that the leading causes of youth unemployment in the KRI are economic reliance on oil, economic instability and a mismatch between university education and market needs. This issue is a persistent concern for the youth, sometimes leading to despair - as Lepla’s findings indicate that 20% of graduates had given up seeking employment due to the lack of prospects. Similarly, Jiyad et al (2021) indicate that youth unemployment was a recurring theme among all their interviewees who considered migrating. They identified the frustrating discrepancy between aspirations and existing opportunities. Youth unemployment is exacerbated by the unequal and inadequate development of the private sector. Erbil, the capital, is where 63% of local firms and 73% of foreign firms were registered as early as 2014. In other provinces, private-sector employment opportunities are scarce. Job scarcity perceivably makes Kurdistan’s young graduates feel abandoned by the government (Lepla, 2022). 

Of Kurdistan’s six million population, 28% or 1.7 million are aged 15-29 (Rudaw, 2023), marking a significant youth bulge which must be integrated into the laborforce. Fazil and Connelly (2023) remark on the distinction between the youth and their middle-aged parents. These youth who grew up under Kurdish self-rule did not participate in Kurdistan’s nation-building project, nor are they public sector employees with party loyalties. At the same time, they are not absorbed into the private job market. This generation differs from their parents’, as they do not share the memory of growing up under the Ba’athist tyranny or double embargo; they expect their Kurdish rulers to provide services and employment opportunities equitably. Moreover, the youth do absorb the struggles of their middle-aged, public servant parents, who go months without salaries.  According to the calculations of Kurdistan Watch, a social media channel, between 2015 and 2024, 58 salaries were paid in full, while 44 salaries were paid in half (KW, 2024). Moreover, the KRG owes 23 trillion and 116 billion IQD to its civil servants (Fontenille, 2025). 

In addition to economic concerns, the youth are pulled by political stability, social security, and freedoms (Ahmed et al. 2023, Lepla, 2022). However, economic well-being remains the primary determinant of migration (Ibid). The World Bank corroborates this, reporting that unemployment and job scarcity are the leading push factors (2018). When looking at the Raparin Administration, migration and economic opportunities are crucially factored into migration decision-making. Ahmed et al. (2023) discovered that migration decisions are made with familial consensus and assistance. Families sometimes select and finance the migration of one individual, hoping they will find work and send remittances. The families perceived that migration was a means for finding better economic opportunities. 

Conversely, individual and collective perceptions of the West also promote migratory behavior. In ‘Elites and Emulators’, a respondent to Paasche’s interviews (2018;201) mentions that in the collective imagination of Kurds, the life of migrants in Europe is idealized, often envisioning government support. 

4.3 Capabilities as Pull Factors 

Two factors differentiate Kurdish waves of migration in the 21st century. Firstly, Kurds are fleeing a Kurdish government, not a foreign one. Secondly, illicit migration is on the rise. The definition of irregular migration, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM,2018), is:

“Movement of persons that takes place outside the laws, regulations, or international agreements governing the entry into or exit from the State of origin, transit or destination…the term is generally used to identify persons moving outside regular migration channels.”

For many Kurds, the expansion of smuggling rings and illicit means has functioned as a capability. For reference, the 8,000 Iraqis stuck on the Belarus-Poland border in 2021 had traveled irregularly (Khoury, 2024). Moreover, an investigation by the BBC on Barzan Majeed, a migrant smuggler, told the channel that he had illegally transported anywhere from a thousand to ten thousand people across the English Channel (BBC, 2024). Another smuggler from Erbil who spoke to the BBC in 2024 claimed that he smuggled more than 5,000 individuals out of Kurdistan to the United Kingdom. Typically, a journey to Europe costs 6,000 USD but can go up to 20,000 USD (Migrant Project, 2025). 

Social stratification is also manifest in how Kurds migrate. To clarify, a survey by the IOM and KRSO (2018) found that the monthly income per household in the KRI is 850$. The same report details the insufficiency of average incomes to finance migration. With an average size of 5 individuals per household,  the income per capita per day is 5$. Given that range of 6,000-2,000$ for a migration journey, a single trip represents 7–24 years of an average individual’s entire disposable income. This clarifies why it is predominantly middle and lower-middle-income households that opt for illicit migration, as money can be borrowed or assets sold to finance a journey. Meanwhile, higher-income families are expected to travel regularly (work or education visas, golden visa programs). 

Illicit migration is unsafe, costly, and may be unsuccessful, but still functions as a facilitator. Khoury (2024, 5) notes that legal pathways for migration could be pursued via a work visa or education visa, or humanitarian admission. However, these may require resources and connections to obtain. Therefore, some opt for illicit means to migrate. 

Kurdish migrants are pulled to the West, particularly Europe. Typically, Kurds' preferred destinations are Germany and the United Kingdom (UK). Sirkeci (2005, 206) illustrates that from 1980 to 2002, Germany and the UK were in the top 5 list of countries receiving asylum seekers from Iraq. The destination is attractive as Kurdish youth have perceptions of Europe being a prosperous region that provides welfare and social benefits (Ahmed et al. 2023;418, IOM,2015;2). To add, Kurds know that Europe's aging population or low birth rates could potentially increase employment opportunities for young migrants. Moreover, Europe's geographical proximity to the Middle East is a further pull factor (Ahmed et al, 2023). 

In terms of capability, families interviewed by Ahmed et al. (2023) appeared highly informed of the migration process and life in the destination countries because of diaspora networks. The Kurds’ preferred destinations, being the United Kingdom or Germany, coincide with the fact these countries are home to a large Kurdish diaspora, who have ties with Kurds at home and can facilitate their migration through practical assistance (Garip, 2008,612; Paasche,2020;189). Moreover, Khoury’s respondents stated that their trusted sources for migration information are their relatives, family, and friends who have already migrated (2024). Additionally, Khoury’s empirical research found that Kurdish survey respondents relied on online and traditional media to gather information on migration, making access to media another capability. 

5. Conclusion 

The findings of this paper agree with previous research that meager economic opportunities are a leading factor of migration in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Although, this brief  was limited insofar as it only considered Kurdish migration to Europe, and it did not focus on the migration policies of neighboring or European countries vis-à-vis Kurdish asylum seekers and migrants. 

Moving on, it is evident that KRI's youth are in pursuit of a functional economy, actualized and stable wages, and the ability to build educational and career paths allowing for upward mobility. To date, these appear unattainable in the Kurdistan region. It can be said, then, that for much of Kurdistan’s youth, their aspirations and vision for the future seem unachievable at home.

Indeed, economic inertia, combined with closed political opportunities, has caused a generation that considers migration. On the other hand, the expansion of smuggling rings and diaspora networks are predominant capabilities that facilitate migration.

Concerning the implications. The future trajectory is likely going to contain persistent out-migration if structural reforms do not address patronage, economic diversification, and stabilized wages that align with the costs of living. If clientelism and patronage networks remain the dominant path to employment and upward mobility, if public salaries remain unstable, while the private sector remains underdeveloped and monopolized by the very same patrons, if salaries remain in arrears, the youth will be inclined to migrate. 

As discussed, duopoly party rule and patronage networks create a sense of social inequality and class division. It entrenches class stratification and class mobility, thereby increasing disillusionment with the authorities. This has direct implications for political participation and trust in institutions and representatives since the authorities are seen as creators, perpetrators, and benefactors of the class divide. Aziz and Van Veen (2023;1) have found that political representation in the KRI is poor, leading to low voter turnouts and high disenchantment with elites. To illustrate, a public sector employee who participated in the hunger strikes to demand salaries stated that he no longer trusts Kurdish authorities as their demands go unheard (Fontenille, 2025). The further spreading of these sentiments risks eroding the legitimacy of the KRI from within. 

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