Blog

According to a longitudinal study of 135 countries, one fact comes to the surface; the total duration/lifespan of those democratic countries where the GDP per capita is one thousand dollars or less is merely 13 years old; however, the duration/lifespan of those democracies becomes 60 years when the GDP per capita is measured 3,000 or 6,000 dollars. Likewise, no democratic system with 6,000 thousand dollars in GDP per capita has ever collapsed. This study conducted by Adam Przeworski has concentrated on democratic systems but it is possible that the findings apply to non-democratic systems as well, indicating the possibility that - a&nbsp;low-income&nbsp;authoritarian regime is more likely to collapse than a&nbsp;high-income&nbsp;authoritarian regime. Put briefly, one could establish a correlation between political stability and the state of the economy. This implies that to extend the lifespan/duration of a political system, efforts must be made to ensure a robust, stable economic system. Moreover, two other scientifically valid conclusions could be established.&nbsp;Firstly, for political structures to be long-lasting, they must be aided by a robust economy. Secondly, contra, if one is to maintain a robust economy, the political structure must be built in a manner that accommodates and fosters economic development.&nbsp;<blockquote>Simply put, economic growth refers to the strengthening of economic structures in the production of goods, creating job opportunities, and increasing the country's Gross Domestic Product, to build a strong and independent economic system. Economic growth, on the other hand,&nbsp;refers to income inflation; when income does arrive in the country but is not conducive to improving the economic system or changing the economic structure.&nbsp;</blockquote> Economic development is measured by GDP per capita. Reliable data that measures GDP per capita in the KRI is not available, indicating that the extent of economic development in the region remains questionable.&nbsp;What does take place in the Kurdistan Region is economic growth, not economic development. Because, although the number of&nbsp;capitalists has increased, the economic system and structure remain the same as before. The number of wage earners has increased and not decreased, as have unemployment and poverty; the same goes for low levels of domestic production and high levels of imports.&nbsp;Creating a market for foreign products weakens the economy and does not strengthen it. Attracting foreign investment and not encouraging domestic investment does not strengthen the economy either, because in times of crisis, with the slightest threat, foreign investors retract their payments and capital.&nbsp;In discussing the social prerequisites of a democratic system that make a country more receptive to democracy, Seymour Martin Lipzd prescribes four main dimensions: capital, industry, education, and urbanization. For a country with substantial capital, which also has developed industry and a proper, modern education system, as well as a healthy urbanization process, the possibility of democratization is much stronger, compared to a country that does not encompass these four dimensions. These four principles, because they are the four dimensions of civil society in the modern state, make the middle class&nbsp;efficient and impactful.&nbsp;&nbsp;Democracy as a system denotes a two-dimensional relationship between the people and the power-holders. The first dimension is - that those in power must respond to the demands of the people, and secondly, the people can, relatively, influence decision-making. The aforementioned principles serve to bring the people closer to the power holders and the political structure. In that, a form of stability is achieved, wherein neither of the two main constituents (the people and the power-holders) are a threat to one another; neither does the political structure threaten the people's welfare, nor do the people threaten the stability of the political structure.&nbsp;&nbsp;According to IMF and World Bank figures, at least four of the Gulf countries are among the world's richest in terms of GDP Per capita – the lowest being Bahrain at 49,020$ and Amman at 4,3847$ US dollars. According to global statistics on democracy and freedoms, the Gulf countries are all undemocratic and unfree. One could ask why have the Gulf countries not stepped towards democracy and freedom. Does capital really affect changes in the political system? The answer is that the oil-rich Gulf countries are rentier states, which means that most or all of the national income comes from renting domestic assets to foreign customers. (Hussein Mahdavi used this theory for the first time in the 1960s).&nbsp;&nbsp;There are four characteristics that qualify a country as a rentier state, as the political scientists Hazim Bablawi and Giacomo Luciani have detailed:&nbsp; First, the country is dominated by foreign rents, second, the the entire economy relies on foreign income, thus the country does not require a strong domestic investment sector. Third, only a small portion of the labor force participates in generating income. Fourthly and most importantly, the government or the state is the main beneficiary of&nbsp;external rents.&nbsp;This also hinders economic development, seeing that economic development requires domestic revenue, the existence of a domestic investment sector, a labor force, and a free market. These four attributes of a rentier state distort the order of the political structure, Why exactly does that occur? Because the natural relationship between the economic system and the political structure is disrupted.&nbsp;Consequently, the 23 countries with the largest oil and gas revenues have&nbsp;stagnant&nbsp;and undemocratic political structures.&nbsp;In a rentier state, there are two factors that hiddenly weaken state institutions: first, that the revenues come from&nbsp;abroad,&nbsp;and second, that the incoming revenue goes directly to the state.&nbsp;&nbsp;Citizens of these countries rely solely on the state and resort to the state's institutions to find employment, secure wages, and improve their living conditions. This puts the official institutions of the state under pressure (the main function of the state is thus reduced to salary distribution). In such circumstances, the survival of the state relies on one thing; buying legitimacy. That takes place through selling oil to foreign buyers. Such a political system is completely weak because to secure&nbsp;public revenues&nbsp;and protect itself, the state relies on external income and power. The source of economic and political stability is not its market, its people, or its legitimacy, but it is another power.&nbsp;<blockquote>Therefore, oil can improve the quality of life, but it leaves the economic structure weak. This is what distinguishes most oil-rich countries; significant economic growth without economic development.</blockquote>There are many factors that hinder economic development, but the most important is the phenomenon of (owner and buyer) or (master and customer). Such a phenomenon is what prevents the existence of a free market because it prevents a fundamentally independent private sector. In the Gulf countries, this unhealthy dynamic prevents the emergence of an independent private sector. (It is also the reason why Gulf countries do not head towards&nbsp;political liberalization).&nbsp;&nbsp;What has happened, both in the Kurdistan Region as a preliminary process and in the Gulf countries as a result of this process has been the transfer of jobs and investment in areas previously monopolized (in the Kurdistan Region, they were monopolized by the government or political parties) to partners, collaborations/assistants of the state or those who administer it.&nbsp; The private sector has certainly become more prosperous in the Kurdistan Region, but because it is not independent, and because it is not self-sufficient, it has not been able to&nbsp;take charge&nbsp;in times of political crisis. What is especially remarked in the Kurdistan region is that, instead of providing aid, the private sector is responsible for some of the economic issues that the region suffers from.&nbsp;&nbsp;If the private sector and the power center become closer with the goal of operating together, contrary to what is understood, both will suffer losses; Neither the government can perform its functions to ensure legitimacy, nor can the private sector strengthen the economic structure, which is again the goal of the private sector.&nbsp;Both will suffer instead.&nbsp;As is clear in the region, the collapse of one will ensure the collapse of the other. The main reason is that the private sector has expanded haphazardly and without restriction, becoming an extension, and even a replacement of the public sector.&nbsp;The private sector has not been independent in the sense that many units of the private sector were either directly or indirectly owned by those in power, meaning those in power did not permit the private sector to be independent. Rather, the private sector has been, more or less under their dominion,&nbsp;and the private sector has been dependent on the rulers.&nbsp;&nbsp;Therefore, it became apparent that when the government faced an income crisis, it had an immediate impact on all units of the private sector in the region. Most projects in development were stopped and an increasing number of contractors declared bankruptcy. So, to protect the region, we must look at the economic system and the political structure, and more importantly, how they relate and interact,&nbsp;by reorganizing&nbsp;the functions of the public sector and the services and investments delivered by the private sector.&nbsp;The most important point is to draw a line between the private and public sectors. Neither should cross the boundaries of the other. Currently, the private sector has crossed the boundaries of the public sector, which must be amended. The second point is to limit foreign investment, Taking into account the political situation in the region, it is a guaranteed loss to bring foreign investment into the country at the expense of domestic investments. It was seen that most foreign investors fled at the sight of emerging threats.&nbsp;&nbsp;The fundamental solution is to support and encourage domestic investment, and for the government to fulfill its main function, which is monitoring the work of domestic investors. Because the government can take a number of measures against domestic investors, but it cannot do so with foreign investors. The economic system of the region needs a fundamental overhaul, but any kind of reform must take two things into account; first, the social structure, and second, the political structure. Without a proper reading and understanding of these two issues, it is unlikely that any economic reform will have remarkable results.&nbsp; Works CitedBeblawi, Hazem. “The Rentier State in the Arab World.” Source: Arab Studies Quarterly, vol. 9, no. 4, 1987, pp. 383–398,&nbsp;Hazem Beblawi, and Giacomo Luciani. The Rentier State. Routledge, 16 July 2015.“IMF ELibrary.” Imfsg, <a href="http://www.elibrary.imf.org/" data-mce-href="http://www.elibrary.imf.org/">www.elibrary.imf.org</a>.Lipset, Seymour Martin. “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy.” The American Political Science Review, vol. 53, no. 1, 1959, pp. 69–105.Mahdavy, H. The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of Iran. 1963.“Open Knowledge Repository.” Worldbank.org, 2019, openknowledge.worldbank.org.Przeworski, Adam. Democracy and Economic Development*. 2000.&nbsp;

An analysis of the Economic System of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq

We’re currently living in the information age and digital devices have taken over our lives, hence the need for safety and confidentiality on the internet is at an all time high. According to Cybersecurity Ventures[1], it was predicted that the cost of damages inflicted by cybercrimes would be $10.5 trillion by 2025.&nbsp; Stuxnet was a cyberweapon created jointly by the US government and Israel, and it targeted an Iranian nuclear power plant which eventually infected 200000 computers and caused around 1000 machines to malfunction[2]. Another cyberattack that targeted the global shipping company FedEx resulted in a $300 million worth of financial damage and its stocks dropping by 79 cents per share[3]. The internet service company Yahoo! also faced what was known as the largest data breach in history in 2016 and had 500 million user accounts and their personal data stolen[4][5].&nbsp;Countries and large corporations have invested large sums of capital on both their technological infrastructure and on acquiring experts and specialists in the field of cybersecurity. It is said that Microsoft intends to spend $20 billion to ensure its services are safe and protected from cyber attacks[6]. As of 2023, the US Government’s budget for the country’s cybersecurity is $15.6 billion[7], and we also have a country like the United Arab Emirates with a budget of $79 billion for the next five years (2022-2026). As the Kurdistan Regional Government is seeking technological progress and the digitalization of the government, what would be the repercussions of the leap towards the digital world? And what actions would the government take to protect and secure its facilities and its citizens on the internet?&nbsp;The KRG should plan to assign a budget for strengthening and empowering the security of its technological infrastructure. An effortless yet very crucial step the KRG can take towards this goal could be through providing training courses to the employees in its public sector to spread awareness, for human error is said to be the most prevalent cause of cyberattacks[9]. Perhaps the KRG also ought to bridge the gap between the lack of talents and the high demand of cybersecurity specialists for both the public and private sector whether through collaborating with academic institutions or international cybersecurity firms so as to train students and graduates with the required skills in order for them to ensure the safety of their workplaces.

Cybersecurity Risks and KRG’s Technology Infrastructure

<blockquote>Yerevan Xeber dide! (Yerevan is speaking) </blockquote>Those were the first Kurdish words aired on the Public Radio of Armenia in 1955. Beyond Soviet-Armenia’s borders, it was known as Radio Yerevan, and it set the stage for facilitated and strengthened unofficial connections between all parts of Kurdistan in the Cold War era.&nbsp;<h3>Intra-Kurdish communication across borders</h3>There has always been some degree of connection and communication between the different parts of Kurdistan, no matter the regional geopolitical circumstances. Iran and Turkey, and to some extent Syria and Iraq, were strongly centralized and had heavily controlled and securitized borders in the Cold War era. Ultimately, the geopolitical divide did weaken cross-border, intra-Kurdish communication. However, that never made Kurds completely disconnected from one another. Ofra Bengio puts it succinctly when she says:&nbsp;<blockquote>"Even though Kurdish communities were politically separated from each other by the post-first World War redrawing of boundaries and subsequently evolved along different paths in light of their varying experiences within the new states, the borders between the states were never hermetically sealed, and Kurdish communities remained in contact with one another and were mutually influenced by developments beyond state lines."&nbsp;</blockquote>Radio Yerevan is one example of lasting contact, as it became a unifying medium that transcended borders. In the second half of the 20th century, when the Kurdish language and cultural expressions were banned in the assimilationist or denialist efforts of Turkish, Arab, and Iranian nation-states, Kurds could still be heard singing, reading, and conversing on Radio Yerevan. The radio, especially at the time, was a perfectly fitted means for the expression of Kurdish culture, which has traditionally been shaped by orality.&nbsp;<h3>The Genesis of Radio Yerevan&nbsp;</h3>Kurdish programs were allowed under the administration of the Soviet Union to spread communist political agendas to Kurds elsewhere. Radio Yerevan's success is beholden to one Yazidi Kurd, Casime Celil, who was the broadcast editor. Celil, with the help of his family and collaboration projects with Armenians and Kurds, used the station to revive and disseminate Kurdish music and language. &nbsp; What started as a Soviet initiative, became a powerful means for Kurds to connect while preserving their culture.&nbsp;<h3>Casime Celil&nbsp;</h3>A poet, translator, and educator, Casime Celil was born in 1908 to a family of Yazidi Kurds. He was about 10 years old when he fled the Armenian genocide with his family then spent his teenage years in orphanages.&nbsp; As a young adult, Casime Celil moved to Yerevan to work and study after the Bolsheviks had successfully transformed the Russian Empire into the Soviet Union. Upon his arrival, Yerevan was the capital of Soviet Armenia. In 1954, Casime Celil became head of Radio Yerevan's Kurdish department.&nbsp;At a time when the Kurdish language and culture were heavily banned in Middle Eastern states, Radio Yerevan became a sanctuary for cultural expression and preservation. As Hassanpour writes (1996:330) <blockquote>''Listening to Kurdish broadcasts was considered an act against the Turkish state'' However, despite the state's linguicide policies, ''the airways from Yerevan, Baghdad and Kermanshah carried music into private homes''.&nbsp;&nbsp;</blockquote>By broadcasting theatrical plays and Kurdish folk songs three times per week during a time of Kurdish persecution, Radio Yerevan connected a nation to its culture and became a staple in the lives of the Kurds who gathered weekly to hear the broadcast.&nbsp; Additionally, Radio Yerevan revolutionized certain cultural practices and made them more accessible. The station transformed songs of dengbej, which were traditionally acapella, by adding Kurdish instruments like def, zurna, and ney to the old songs. Yerevan's archival capacity also runs deep; Artur Ispiryan, the head of the archival department, states there are over 10,000 recordings of Kurdish folk songs and theatrical plays in the radio archives. Radio Yerevan also functioned as a language-learning medium. An example of that is Osman Baydemir, who was the mayor of Diyarbakir from 2004 to 2014. Upon visiting the staff of the Kurdish programs in Yerevan, he said that he had two mothers; one was his biological mother, and the second was Radio Yerevan, as that's where he learned his mother tongue and was able to listen to Kurdish music while it was prohibited in turkey.&nbsp;<h3>Concluding Thoughts&nbsp;</h3>Radio Yerevan was a tool for Kurds to connect and maintain their identity and culture at a time when it was most endangered. The existence of the broadcast was vital. Yerevan not only contributed to the preservation of the Kurdish language and arts. The broadcast also stands as a reminder of the lasting nature of cross-border Kurdish communication, which defies geopolitical boundaries and repressive policies.

Radio Yerevan and Cross-border Kurdish Communication

Perhaps the biggest unresolved matter of the Iraqi constitution is the issue revolving around Article 140. Article 140 asks for the implementation of the 58th article of the TAL.&nbsp;<blockquote>Article 140First: The executive authority shall undertake the necessary steps to complete the implementation of the requirements of all subparagraphs of Article 58 of the Transitional Administrative Law.&nbsp;Second: The responsibility placed upon the executive branch of the Iraqi Transitional Government stipulated in Article 58 of the Transitional Administrative Law shall extend and continue to the executive authority elected in accordance with this Constitution, provided that it accomplishes completely (normalization and census and concludes with a referendum in Kirkuk and other disputed territories to determine the will of their citizens), by a date not to exceed the 31st of December 2007. </blockquote>As of present day, the steps in Article 140 have not been implemented and the issues revolving the said Article are still left hanging and unresolved. As per mentioned in the article, the implementation of the said article shall go through three phases which are; Normalization, Census, and a Referendum in the so called disputed territories. The term ‘disputed territories’ is in itself not clear and problematic, Article 140 only states Kirkuk and ‘other disputed territories’ but different groups within Iraq do not completely agree on the territories and areas which are considered disputed. Due to sensitivity of the subject, the disputed areas should have been named individually and specifically in the constitution to avoid this issue. Apart from that, each phase has its own issues revolving around them.<h3>Normalization&nbsp;</h3>&nbsp; According to the 58 article of the Transitional Administrative Law, normalization requires the accomplishment of four actions: “1. Financial compensation, 2. Nationality correction, 3. Resolution of land disputes, 4. Pre-Ba’ath administrative boundary restoration.”. The article does not make clear the mechanisms for these steps to be implemented and as a result each of these actions faces a number of issues. For example regarding financial compensation, many community representatives have regarded financial compensation to be a major barrier for progress in implementing Article 140. A senior Kurdish official in Kirkuk was quoted saying “The office in Kirkuk now receives 17 billion Iraqi Dinars per year from the sovereign expenses which are to be decreased in 2015 budget…..around 600 billion IQD is the amount needed to complete the procedure.”. This can be seen as an indicator that the federal government in Baghdad does not have the will to finish the procedure. The Article also asks for a sort of de-arabisation in the disputed areas as a part of normalization, families who were brought in after the arabisation campaign would be compensated if they go back to their original cities so that original citizens of Kirkuk would return to their homes. This procedure is in itself fragile because many families mostly Arabs had no intent to go back to their original cities. As well as many deported families that had already started lives elsewhere had little intent to go back to Kirkuk because of the security and educational state of the city. Land disputes are another issue that is not easy to resolve. Until 2015, there were 8800 cases of land disputes dealt with by The Iraq Property Claims Commission (IPCC). A reason for this could be the weak rule of law, but that alone is not the issue. The procedure is slowed down by the number of appeals the decision gets. This shows how ill planned Article 140 is, as the deadline for the completion of all three steps (Normalization, Census, and Referendum) was 31st of December 2007. Pre-Ba’ath administrative boundary restoration is also a problematic procedure.&nbsp; The process includes many districts such as the districts of Kalar and Chamchamal that were detached from Kirkuk and attached to Suleimanya in 1976, the district of Tuz Khurmatu that was attached to the governorate of Sallahuddin in 1976 as well, and Kifri district that was attached to Dyala governorate in the same year. The restoration of pre-ba’ath administrative boundaries is clearly in the favor of the Kurds as the Districts of Chamchamal, Kifri, and Kalar are overwhelmingly Kurdish. As a result this step has faced Arab and Turkmen objections. The argument is that this issue does not limit itself to the Province of Kirkuk, rather the surrounding provinces as well, ultimately affecting all of Iraq. The Arabs and Turkmen further argue that dealing with Kirkuk specifically would need a general agreement between all the parties involved. This agreement has not been reached and the issue remains unresolved. This issue is specifically hard to resolve because of the fact the restoring the boundaries of Kirkuk would mean changing the boundaries of Suleimanya, Dyala,and Sallahuddin this in itself is a complicated procedure and the large objection of the Arabs and Turkmens makes the process of Pre-1975 administrative boundary restoration almost too complicated to ever succeed.&nbsp;<h3>The Census and The Referendum</h3> The issues facing these two procedures are not any less complicated than the normalization procedure. Originally, deadline was put for the census to be held in July 2007. The deadline was not met for a number of reasons. The main issue with the census stemmed from the question of whether to include an ethnicity question to identify the ethnicities in Kirkuk. The data from a census is very important for Kirkuk and the other disputed areas as it will provide data for the referendum that is supposed to take place after the census, but the issue with both the census and the referendum is mainly the same issue, who gets to participate and vote?.&nbsp; There is no clear answer to that question as the parties involved with the issue all have conflicting ideas on voter eligibility. The Arabs argue that anyone with Kirkuki documents should be allowed to vote in the referendum, while the Kurds ask for an implementation of the 1957 census as it precedes the arabisation campaign and includes the detached districts of Chamchamal, Kifri, Kalar, and Tuz, the Turkmen also argue for the implementation of the same census but with the current boundaries of Kirkuk.&nbsp; The Arabs completely refuse the implementation of the 1957 census and the Kurds and Turkmen reject the proposition that anyone with Kirkuki documents is eligible to vote, the Kurds and Turkmen also reject each other’s propositions, and as a result negotiations often have led to fail. The Arab rejection of the 1957 census is understandable since the number of Arabs eligible to vote would fall drastically. The issues regarding Article 140 often overlap each other as it is seen here, the issue of voter eligibility overlaps with the issue of Kirkuk’s boundary restoration, in turn making the whole process much more difficult and complicated.&nbsp;<h3>Conclusion&nbsp;</h3>These issues can be traced with the imprecise language of the Article 140 of the constitution, it calls for a referendum but does not specify who is eligible to vote and exactly which districts should be involved in the referendum, it calls for a restoration of the pre 1975 boundaries but does not clarify the mechanisms that should take place to achieve such a complicated step, as a result the Article remains as what it was, words on paper that are most likely never to be implemented.&nbsp;

Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution: A critical analysis

This summary will briefly highlight the components of ethnic identity. If one is to ask, "What is it that defines a person?" One could say it is ethnic identity, for ethnic identity is the set of symbols that define and distinguish a people. But one cannot produce these symbols alone. For instance, language, which is an index feature of identity, requires a group of people for its emergence and practice. This is true of all the other symbols mentioned in this article.&nbsp;An individual is the carrier of symbols of ethnic identity and may embody them, but he is not their creator. Insofar as an individual is a member of a group with a distinct ethnic identity, he is bestowed with certain index features, in contrast to another person who is a member of another community, who has another distinct ethnic identity.The index features of identity can be classified into two categories. The first category consists of the primary symbols, which include culture, faith, belief systems, and rituals. The second category includes dress, language, physical features, and color (Manin Nash 1996: 24).Upon reflection it can be concluded that culture consists of the rules that govern the relationships between people and regulate the way they behave toward one another—the embodiment of their everyday life. Belief is the method by which people make sense of their existence; they speak of the unseen—the origins of their existence, the meaning of their existence, and where they go in the afterlife—that connects one to a force that cannot be seen but can be felt. Belief defines one's relationship with life, and belief becomes part of one's identity. Belief systems, in the light of faith, whether secular or sacred, regulate people's relationship with one another. To illustrate, if one's culture sets certain guidelines on how to communicate with those in one’s proximity, then belief systems, in the light of faith, would instruct one on how to behave toward another—and in line with its instructions, it would identify a reward or punishment system.The secondary features include dress (what kind of clothing one wears), language, physical features, and color. These are referred to as secondary features because they are components of a culture. Take language; speaking in Kurdish, distinguishes one from someone else who speaks Persian, Arabic, or Turkish. Language plays a central role in constructing a collective consciousness and common understanding, prerequisites to cooperation and coexistence. While physical features and color identify us and distinguish us from someone of European or African descent. This foundation, consisting of the index features of ethnic identity, makes it known who a member of a nation is and who is external to the boundaries of said nation.Therefore, these markers, whether they are primary or secondary, must be embodied (such as rituals), felt (such as beliefs), visible (dress), heard (like language), and practiced (like culture). These must have a constant presence to become a part of life. These markers not only define a ethnic community but also create it. For example, these markers not only distinguish a Kurd from a Persian or Turkish individual by identifying him as distinctive, but they also give a specific essence to the Kurd, and this essence is embodied in the Kurdish individual's traditions, language, and dress—in other words, these markers bestow upon him a socio-cultural essence.At the end of this article, a logical position as to how to preserve this essence will be given. What is the origin of these symbols, and where do they come from? Certainly, they are rooted in history (Hobsbawm 1992: 16); that is to say, a group of people has decided to live together in a territory, communicate with one another (culture), communicate with one another, and understand each other (language), and dress in a manner suited to the geographical center they inhabit (dress) (Benedict Anderson, 1983; Anthony D. Sims, 1991). They have decided to defend the land they inhabit together, not to migrate or leave it. With the passage of time, their feeling of belonging to each other and their attachment to the territory has increased, and they have become one nation. Together they have become the embodiment of a shared life (Ernest Renan 1996, defines a nation as a common spirit.) That is ethnic identity, the Kurdish people, on Kurdish land. Thus, identity is two-dimensional, belonging to a land and belonging to a people. This is a prerequisite for the creation of a nation-state. When the boundaries of a nation become one with the boundaries of a state, the state extends as far as the boundaries of the nation (see Ernest Gellner, 1983).Where there exists a group of people, there exists their social framework, and where there is a social framework, there are tools for its preservation. These tools are the index features of culture; therefore, the differences between groups of people are those index features that identify them. That is why those index features must be embodied and made visible because those index features tell us who is a member of the group and which cultural prerequisites are needed for membership (see Manning Nash 1996: 26).The purpose of these index features is the creation and preservation of a group. The index features that distinguish an ethnic identity are the features that protect its boundaries. If these boundaries are repeatedly violated by members of a nation, then the ethnic identity risks extinction. To illustrate, dress; making a habit of wearing the clothing of a nation not your own, would signify that the dress of another nation defines you; or, if you repeatedly speak in a language that is not your mother tongue, not the tongue of the members of your nation, that makes it so that you speak in the language of another nation. If that is repeated for all index features of ethnic identity, then that nation will cease to exist. It will assimilate into the culture of another nation and will become part of another ethnic community. Meaning; that a nation, in losing its ethnic identity, loses itself, and that is called ethnic suicide. What one can take away from this is; that the risk of extinction is imposed on a community when its ethnic identity is no longer kept alive by its members. The key takeaway here is - insofar as an individual is the holder of an ethnic identity, and initially embodies it within himself, then the practice of indexing features of ethnic identity by that individual keeps the ethnic identity alive and preserves that national community. The opposite of this is also true, meaning that if the individuals of said nation do not embody the index features of their ethnic identity and do not practice them in their everyday lives, then those individuals contribute to the extinction of their ethnic identity. With the cessation of their ethnic culture, that nation will also cease to exist. Then, if the index features of an ethnic identity - culture, beliefs, rituals, alongside language, dress, and physical features - are preserved, then the ethnic identity of that group is also preserved. That means ethnic identity is the essence of the national group. This is a crucial and existential subject. Now, we Kurds are under constant threat, and we are in a continuous cultural war, and one cannot be neutral on a battlefield; to elucidate, when you dress in another nation's clothing - you have made your decision, you have willingly killed a part of your nation's ethnic identity and have instead preserved the ethnic identity of another nation. Likewise, if it is decided that you speak in a language that is not Kurdish, if you do not reconcile with your own culture and do not take pride in it, then you take pride in another culture. If this is repeated for all the index features that distinguish your national-ethnic identity, the result would be that you have become a member of another national community and you have lost your ethnic identity; then, your ethnic identity has been lost on your battlefield.We Kurds as a nation are in a constant war for survival, whether you feel it or not, you are in a constant war for survival, from distant history until now, Kurdishness and the ethnic identity of Kurds (that are related to the six symbols of ethnic identity) have been passed down and entrusted to you. Because your ancestors had decided not to assimilate into another nation and to live their lives as Kurds in their own nation - that is Kurdistan (That is why there are now people called Kurds and a land called Kurdistan). But, from here onwards, it is the responsibility of each individual member of the Kurdish nation, especially the youth, to ask one important question; do they want to pass on this nation's ethnic identity that has been passed down and entrusted to them - or have they decided that it will die with them? The proper sensibility is to handle this entrustment responsibly and to keep it alive now, and the only way to keep it alive is to practice it and pass it down to posterity. The youth of today can be the cause of their nation's preservation or extinction. What the nation expects of the youth is to become the nation's life force and to embody the nation's essence. ReferencesAnderson, Benedict.1983. &nbsp;Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso.Ernest Renan, 1996. “The Nation” in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith Ethnicity, Oxford reader, Oxford: oxford university press.Gellner, Ernest.1983.&nbsp;Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.Hobsbawm, E.J. 1992 Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Manning Nash, 1996. “The Core Elements of Ethnicity” in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith Ethnicity, Oxford reader, Oxford: oxford university press.Smith, Anthony D. 1991.&nbsp;National Identity. Reno: University of Nevada Press.&nbsp;

Prerequisites for the Preservation of National Identity, and a Reflection on the Role of Youth.

Kurdistan's Youth Exodus: Economic Struggles and Mass Migration

NSI - ENG

research

Open Sans

Work Sans

Nishtman Strategy Institute uses cookies to ensure you get the best experience on our site.

Research Articles

An analysis of the Economic System of the Kurdistan Regio...

Cybersecurity Risks and KRG’s Technology Infrastructure

Radio Yerevan and Cross-border Kurdish Communication

Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution: A critical analysis

Prerequisites for the Preservation of National Identity, ...

Kurdistan's Youth Exodus: Economic Struggles and Mass Mig...