A Brief Discussion on Political Systems: Institutions and Political Elites

Introduction

Political parties are the means by which political elites connect to formal institutions (formal political institutions such as governmental cabinets or parliaments); that is why understanding the nature of political parties is crucial for understanding the relation of the political elite to the public on the one hand, and, for understanding the relation of the political elite to the formal institutions on the other.

In the Kurdistan region, the leaders of political parties direct their parties as ideologues and decision-makers. Thus, the political parties can direct their supporters and followers, the relationship is top-down. In none of the parties in the region are the party supporters capable of directing the political parties.

Political parties play a central role; it is unlikely that any other type or model of social movements or social networks could replace the role and place of political parties (Huntington, 1996). 

In the Kurdistan Region, it is possible that the importance of political elites lies in the powers that they hold. Theoretically, the concept of elites is diffused with the concept of power. Here, power is conceptualized in two ways; Potential Power and Actual Power. Potential power refers to a state wherein the political elite in themselves are sources of power. One can picture  a party leader who has masses of wealth or enjoys extensive intellectual capacities. However, Actual Power refers to the power that political elites receive from formal institutions, which is a legally defined and senctioned power.

Put differently; Potential Power comes from informal institutions, including social structures, political parties, or a particular religion and worldview. But, Actual Power comes from formal institutions, such as a Parliament bestowing powers upon its Parliament Members, or the Council of Ministers bestowing power upon its Ministers.

What is the purpose of political institutions? 

Institutions, according to Huntington (1965:388) are stable and valuable centers in which behaviors and actions are repeated (For example, parliaments and parliament members). Meaning that institutions are the accumulation of rules and organizational behaviors that persist for a certain period, and many of these institutions bring about a political order that more or less makes up a political system. Thus, political institutions shape a political structure and lay the principles and rules of political action. Institutions can be classified in a few ways, three of which include formal, semi-formal, and informal.

Formal institutions

Formal institutions refer to those characteristics that define a particular political system. The organizational structure of institutions and their arrangement in relationship to one another determines the type of the political system. To illustrate, both the parliament and the government are two formal institutions; their relation to one another determines the type of the political system. If in a political system, the parliament were to exercise hegemony over the government, then the political structure would be parliamentarian. If the government were to exercise hegemony, then it would be a presidential structure. Thus, the difference between majoritarian and consensus democracy lies in their differences regarding their organizational structures and the relations of institutions to one another. These formal institutions in the region must be reorganized to establish a consensus parliamentary system (consensus democracy). Of the formal institutions in the region, four of them must be reorganized for the establishment of a consensus parliamentary system (consensus democracy). Firstly, the composition of the governmental cabinet must be based on political consensus. Secondly, the relationship between the government and the parliament must be a balanced relationship in which the parliament exercises hegemony. Thirdly, the political party system must be a multi-party system, not a two-party one. Fourthly, the electoral system must be proportionally representative. Meaning that the number of seats in parliament each party has must be proportional to the number of voters they have and have a proportional share in the government. This is what must take place instead of majoritarian representation, where only one or two parties make up the government.

Semi-formal institutions

Semi-formal institutions refer to those preliminary agreements that exist between influential party elites that become prerequisites for the organization and functionality of formal institutions. To consolidate a consensus parliamentary system in the region, two semi-formal institutions are needed. First, all influential parties and their leaders must participate in the government. Secondly, extensive autonomy must be given to all governorates in terms of political, cultural, and economic administration.

Informal institutions

Those complex social structures that give order to social relations, such as a feeling of togetherness - whether that feeling is based on faith or worldview. In the Kurdistan region, informal institutions include religions and creeds, ideologies, and supporters of political parties (supporters of a political party are united by a sense of belonging to said party). Just as formal and semi-formal institutions compose a political system, in the same way, informal institutions shape political systems and have a notable impact on the effectiveness of formal institutions. To illustrate, in the Kurdistan Region, formal institutions must consider informal institutions. The parliament is a formal institution and party supporters are informal ones; if the parliament does not take party supporters into account, then it is not unlikely that the formal institution would face impediments and suspensions. Or, the legislative branch must take into account the beliefs of the majority and not pass laws that conflict with the beliefs that the majority holds. 

What exists in the region can be theorized as elite-democracy. 

Two characteristics of democratic-elite theory include discussing democracy by highlighting both formal institutions as well as the role of political elites. The theory puts forth two hypotheses; first is that, political power lies in formal political institutions. Secondly, political elites are the catalysts of institutions and exercise hegemonic power over formal institutions in times of decision-making.

There is a truth that is somewhat neglected in the Kurdistan region. That truth is that supporting political elites is one of the most important prerequisites for the establishment of democratic institutions in transitional phases - such as the one the Kurdistan Region is undergoing. The scientific conclusion here would suggest that the most preliminary step to be taken, is to transform political disagreements into consensus instead. That step must be taken to guarantee one of the most effective prerequisites for political stability and institutional rigidity; Political Consensus.

When political elites are in consensus, they reach a degree of unanimity regarding the value and importance of the work of political institutions (ie: all political elites would respect the decisions of the parliament as decisions stemming from a formal institution). Reorganizing institutions in a way that prevents the rise of majoritarian democracy, but rather consolidates consensus-democracy is the only way for the political elite to reach consensus and unanimity. Following a consensus parliamentary system based the principles of public interest and common interest must be attempted. 

Works Cited

C. Wright Mills. The Power Elite.1956.

G. William Domhoff. Who Rules America? 1967.

Grofman, Bernard, and Arend Lijphart. Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences.  Agathon Press, 1986.

Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. Riverside, Simon & Schuster, 1996.

Mills, C. W. “COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURE: A STUDY of DECISION MAKERS. By Floyd Hunter. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953. 

Schumpeter, Joseph. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1942.