Kurdistan's Youth Exodus: Economic Struggles and Mass Migration
The Kurdistan region of Iraq (KRI), from its official inception in 2005 until 2013, enjoyed a boom cycle in its economy that enabled it to use oil-derived wealth to go from a marginalized area to a recognized region that enjoyed economic prosperity and political stability. By 2013, the KRI's budget amounted to 13 billion dollars, which is almost a ten-fold increase over the previous decade (Jiyad et al. 2020, 38). This unprecedented growth in capital also gave the KRI a form of social capital on the international scene, hailing the region as ‘the other Iraq’ (Fazil, 2023, 3). However, by 2014 - when the boom cycle became a bust cycle, the economic fragilities and deficits in the KRI's economic structure became evident. Largely because of the economic crises, a generation that lived under Kurdish self-rule administered by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is now fleeing the region. To uncover the causal correlation between the defects in the KRI’s economic system and the increased youth emigration, this paper first gives a brief background on the KRI’s demography, followed by an explication of the structural economic issues, which will be interlaced with interviews of Kurdish migrants that demonstrate that the economic state is a determining factor in migration decisions. Lastly, the conclusion details potential risks of youth migration in the Kurdistan region.
The population of the Kurdistan Region is measured at 6,556,752 as of 2023 (KRSO, 2023). Like the rest of Iraq, the KRI has a significantly youthful demography comprising a nearly equal male and female ratio. According to the Kurdistan Regional Statistical Office, half of the KRI's population is under the age of 32, and 35% under 15 (IOM & KRSO, 2018). The region's significant youth population is both an opportunity and a challenge. The opportunity resides in the fact that qualified youth are consistently graduating, and ready to enter the labor market. According to RAND Corporation (2014), the region's 35 universities enable 24,000 graduates into the job market annually. The challenge is in finding employment for the youthful population. As Lepla (2023) mentions; the KRG's policies have failed to consider integrating the increasing number of graduates into its economy. Even during better economic conditions, especially before the COVID-19 pandemic, an estimated 20% of the 18 to 34-year-old citizens in KRI had low employability prospects (Ozdemir and Alaca, 2021,8 ). By 2020, unemployment rates were measured at 13% for the total population and triple that figure for the youth between 18 and 35 years of age (Ibid). Unsurprisingly then, the majority of emigrants are of the youthful segment. According to Dr. Ali Zalime (2021), one of the reasons for their departure is an issue of employability and economic sustainability - or lack thereof. Unemployability and economic uncertainty have become protracted features of life in the KRI, the reasons for which will be explored in the following part.
Oil Dependence, Unpaid Salaries, and Growing Pessimism
The KRI's heavy dependence on oil is one vulnerability in the economic structure, since it is cause for instability. Apart from its revenues derived from independent oil sales - which are legally disputed and debated by Baghdad, the KRG ought to receive a proportionate percentage of the federal budget that itself is garnered from oil revenues (Romano, 2019). The federal budget transfers, as Mills (2023) describes, ‘are often late or entirely absent, unpredictable in size, and subject to political wrangling’. As a result, the salaries of the public sector are also consistently late, for months at a time. Salary delays bring life to a halt, a burdensome reality for the majority of citizens. More than half of the employed population works for the state in some form (Romano, 2019, 128). For most households of the KRG, public sector salaries are the main source of income and 47% of the total household members are active government employees while 18 percent are pensioners (IOM, KRSO 2018). In addition, many citizens rely on governmental benefits, such as persons with disabilities and lower-income levels. That makes up a total of 1,380,000 people, who are directly dependent on monthly financial distributions from the government (Romano, 2019, 128). These numbers speak to the fact that the KRI’s public sector is bloated, which renders the region more vulnerable to external shocks, as seen in 2014 and 2019 with the oil market collapses, which resulted in governmental failures to provide public sector salaries (World Bank, 2016; Ozdemir and Alaca, 2021). These factors contribute to a sense of economic pessimism and anxiety among citizens. Interviews conducted by Global Partners Governance (2020) included 20 young Kurds from diverse economic backgrounds and found that all participants were pessimistic about the economic future of the KRG (Jiyad et al. 2020). To quote one respondent, "Unemployment is bad, but it gets worse when your families are not paid to support you" (Ibid, 40) Another response exemplifies the helplessness: "Who do we look towards when our families are deprived of their salaries" (Ibid). Currently, the KRG is facing one of its most arduous challenges since its formal inception. As Krasana (2023) describes:
"The pipeline through which it exports some 400,000 barrels of oil a day (b/d) – 10 percent of the overall Iraqi exports and 0.5 percent of global production – has been closed since March 25, at an estimated cost of close to a billion dollars a month (approximately $30 million daily). The KRG has depended on income from oil exports for some 80 percent of its budget."
The closure of its pipelines has meant a delay, if not absence, of salaries again. At the time of writing (18th September 2023), civil servant salaries have not been paid in two months (Rudaw, 2023). It is no surprise that in such dire conditions, economic pessimism is manifesting in civil servants going on strike, especially in the provinces of Sulaymaniyah and Halabja (Rudaw, 2023). The disheartenment is also directed at the region’s feeble private sector, which favors shaky and weary foreign investments over domestic ones, another cause for instability. As one respondent told Global Partners Governance: "Private companies open to shut down in the next crisis" (Jiyad et al., 2020, 42). Even with domestic investments, the private sector is subject to mistrust since it is seen as an extension of the region's rulers or patrons. For a further reading on the KRI’s private sector, refer to our previous publication.
Partially because of the economic challenges, and the consequent unemployment, the youth of KRI increasingly emigrate - legally and illegally - often toward Europe, in search of employability and a higher quality of life. Though there is no official data from Baghdad and Erbil on the number of emigrants (Ozdemir and Alaca, 2021), in interviews with Kurdish youth and news reports, one gets the acumen that emigration among youth is increasing. From unofficial figures gathered through media reports, Dr. Zalime estimates that in 2020 alone, 27,000 people, mostly young, crossed into Europe. In the same year, an operation conducted by Dutch and French police against a network of human smugglers suspected them of illegally transporting nearly 10,000 Kurdish migrants to the United Kingdom (Jiyad et al, 2020, 41). In 2021, according to Lepla (2023), Kurdish migrants made up the majority of those attempting to enter the EU from Belarus to Poland. Shortly after, dinghies sinking in the English Channel caused the death of 26 migrants, 16 of whom were from the KRI (Ibid). Dilan Sirwan, who spoke with a refugee foundation for Rudaw offers more conclusive data, From January to October 2021, around 37,000 thousand people from the KRI and Iraq left the country illegally. On why they chose to leave Iraq or KRI, over 140 immigrants complained of "instability in terms of security, politics and religion" in a letter to the UNHCR. The fact that 2021 saw unprecedented amounts of emigrants is expected. The COVID-19 induced economic crisis lowered economic productivity, sales and employment (Dilshad et al. 2023) Erbil Governorate in Iraq suffered the 5th highest loss in productivity, faced the 2nd largest loss in sales and the lowest in job loss within Iraq (Ibid). Another testimony from a 28-year old migrant, Asos Hassan, a graduate from Koya, reveals the desperate measures the youth are willing to take. Hasan told Al Jazeera in 2021: "I will keep at it even if I get deported dozens of times, I'd rather die than continue living this miserable life," while explaining his struggle to find employment and the subsequent hopelessness about the future. Hassan's unemployment despite being a university graduate is not uncommon. In a questionnaire conducted by Dilshad et al. (2023), out of 72 people aged between 20 to 60 years old, 71% of the respondents with a bachelor's degree reported that they struggle to find jobs. Around a quarter of the respondents held masters degrees, 89% of which had difficulty getting employed (Dilshad et al. 2023). What’s more, the Global Partners Governance interviews found that, regardless of education level, young Kurds are not employed and feel hopeless about their future (Jiyad et al. 2020, 31). The despair runs deep, and it becomes highly visible when discussing migration costs. Kamaran Aziz, who also spoke to Al Jazeera in 2021 claimed that he paid smugglers $6,000 to make the journey to Belarus. This amount is near the average cost that immigrants pay trying to reach Europe. According to Ozdemir and Alaca (2021,4), immigrants pay, on average, three to five thousand dollars trying to reach Europe. The costs cover passports, plane tickets, accommodation and fees paid to smugglers, who often raise the price en route and indebt the migrants.
The report by IOM and KRSO (2018) details that the monthly household income in the KRG is $850. The report also explicates that the average income of an individual is too low to cover the costs of emigrating to Europe. Since there are on average 5 people in one household, and the average income per household is $850, that would imply an individual has 5 dollars per day. The data suggests that mostly middle and lower-middle-income levels can risk migration. Those with lower income finance their migration process by borrowing, highlighting the desperate measures people take. Upper-income levels, on the other hand, are expected to migrate through legal means. The two Kurds who spoke to Al Jazeera in 2021 (Ibrahim, 2021) cited their grievances as; high unemployment rates, unpaid salaries, poor services, corruption, and patronage networks that further impede employment opportunities. Likewise, those interviewed by Romain Lepla (2022) linked the scarcity of job opportunities to feeling abandoned by the government.
Concluding Thoughts: The potential risks of the lack of an effective strategy
Despite the costs and risks, the Kurdistan region of Iraq's youth seem to be fleeing en masse. At closer inspection, the phenomenon underscores the deterioration of the economic situation in the region. Considering the KRI’s population, if the youth keep exiting the region at current rates, the region will soon face a variety of challenges.
Firstly, the region’s economic structure must be reconfigured to reduce economic insecurity. If an independent private sector is not soon developed, and public payroll continues to be delayed - a sense of economic pessimism and anxiety about the future will continue festering among the population, a sense that prompts emigration. Another side effect is human capital flight. Since most of the departed migrants seem to be young, the region risks losing one of its most ambitious, productive, and educated segments of society. The 2020 pandemic resulted in many online businesses emerging that exhibited how many talented young people are willing to commercialize and monetize their skills by starting their own small businesses - the region risks losing its talents if it does not encourage and create opportunities for its youth. Other risks include an imbalanced population demography, since it is mostly young men who do migrate, while their female counterparts stay in the KRI. On another note, the structural economic issues are inherently political as well; Kurdistan's social contract is cracking, and voting rates show that political participation is steadily decreasing while the gap between citizens and elites is widening. Take the voting rates in Erbil, the capital and most populated city of the KRI. In 2010, 76% of eligible voters participated in the elections. In 2014, the voter turnout in Erbil reduced to 72% and in 2018, voter participation plummeted to 50%. This is a region-wide phenomenon, Aziz and Van Veen (2023:1) found that political representation in the KRI is currently poor, which manifests in low voter turnouts and higher disenchantment with elites. That indicates a lack of trust in either the political institutions or the political representatives. Potentially, this could result in a generation that feels underrepresented and therefore detached or hopeless about Kurdish self-rule.
Based on what has been discussed thus far, we could suggest that youth migration could be partially tackled through certain measures. For one, to make effective policies that address mass and unpredictable migration, official data is needed from the KRG and Baghdad. As of now, the lack of data on the number of emigrants, how many have arrived at their destinations safely, and how many have lost their lives makes the phenomenon more difficult to investigate and resolve. More adamantly, the economic structure of the KRG requires close examination and restructuring, to step away from its rentier model that has made half of the population dependent on the public sector for a livelihood that gets slashed and delayed, and the private sector must be nurtured to create sufficient working opportunities for the KRI’s youth and to absorb the increasing number of graduates into the labor force. In pursuit of these ends, the KRG requires a clear strategy concerning its economy, and its impact on the quality of life for the youth. At present, such a strategy is lacking, and this seems to be the crux of this socially protected problem.
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